To What Extent Do Recent Terrorist Attacks in the UK Constitute ‘Intelligence Failure'?

INTRODUCTION

Between 2015 and 2018, intelligence bodies in the UK thwarted over a dozen serious terrorist plots (Glees, 2015, p.283). However, these successes do not provide a clear picture of the terrorism problem in the UK and the role of intelligence. Constituting the aspect of the intelligence failure in the UK are questions of tactical and strategic failure. Strategic failure means that intelligence agencies fail to align with the threat in the first place; hence are caught unaware when the plan is executed. Tactical failure, on the other, involves situations where agencies are aware that certain groups or individuals are planning attacks but are uncertain about the locations and methods of attack (Burke, 2016, p, 115). Most counterterrorism research concentrates on strategic failure while ignoring the critical aspect of tactics in counterterrorism measures. Gill (2020, p.4) described terrorism as the politics of uncertainty since agencies are unaware of the location of the threat but also have difficulties in determining the consequences of the terrorist activities. 

Agencies have to rely on a large pool of information to pinpoint locations and methods that are likely to be used by terrorists. Terrorists are morphing from the traditional methods of acquiring guns and buying bomb-making material to using vans to run over victims or attacks using knives. For example, in 2013, an off-duty officer was run down by a car and hacked to death in the street in London (Gill, 2020, p.43). Counterterrorism methods like tracing the purchase of precursor chemicals for bombs and the acquisition of guns stand little chance against these new methods. The situation is further complicated by the migrant situation in Europe and the UK in particular. Most of the terrorists involved in acts of terrorism across the UK are citizens, which advantages their threats significantly, as opposed to instances where they would use the guise of migration.

Four distinct characteristics define the current terrorism threat faced by the UK; hence, the foundation for intelligence gathering. These characteristics are; (1) the use of violence, (2) political objectives, (3) sowing fear in a target population, and (4) gaining political mileage. The threat is international, and planning may begin in the home countries of the terrorists before execution in the UK. The UK and Europe are facing a wave associated with 'lone wolf' terrorists, who plan and execute a vast array of terrorist activities. Most of these 'lone wolves' often vow their allegiance to a terrorist group outside Europe, especially in the Middle East and Africa. The challenge for security agencies is that it becomes hard to stop such acts before they occur considering the limitations in intelligence because many of these persons do not share information about their attacks before they occur. As such, the shifting profile makes it difficult to quickly identify them (Burke, 2016). Terrorist groups or networks share some common beliefs and often display a willingness to support each other through their overlapping interests. The emergence of lone perpetrators is also emerging as a challenge to agencies since these individuals are almost impossible to track and do not easily leak information.

Understanding the intelligence community in the United Kingdom is critical in assessing the shortcomings of intelligence gathering and failures. Intelligence machinery includes the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Security Service and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (Burke, 2016, p. 28). The operations of the SIS and the Security Service are covert; hence the identity of most of their agents is not public information. The media and citizens abide by an ethical code to avoid exposing information about the intelligence community that might compromise national security. The SIS counterterrorism activities are mainly carried out beyond the UK borders by gathering intelligence and foiling plots against the UK and its citizens. The Security Service mainly undertakes counterterrorism activities at home, ensuring assets, individuals, and crucial information are safe from terrorists. Finally, the GCHQ, whose operations are overt, supports other intelligence agencies through signal intelligence and protection of sensitive information. Interagency intelligence sharing forms a critical part of the activities of the UK Intelligence Community. The departments that the agencies report to include the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Security Service (MI5), and Defence Intelligence (DI). Each department has a specific role in ensuring to collect intelligence reports, as well as, sharing such reports as a way of preventing possible attacks. The agencies play a key role in collecting both foreign and domestic intelligence. 

Between 2005 and 2020, the UK experienced over 800 terrorism incidents with the standout being the London transport System bombings in 2005 and the Manchester Arena Bombings which had 57 and 42 fatalities respectively ( National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism , 2016). Trends show a drop in incidents after the Manchester attacks but a steady rise from 2013 which culminated in the 2017 attacks in London. It can, therefore, be hypothesized that intelligence gathering and analysis improved after the 2005 incident but later become complacent hence allowing terrorists to increase their activities in UK soil. This paper, therefore, explores these trends as they relate to intelligence failure. Table 1 shows incidents from 2005 to 2020.

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

Statement of the Problem

Concerns over intelligence failure in the UK is a multifactorial problem linked not only to the intelligence community but also to policymakers and the media. Europol reported that out of the terror attacks in the UK over the past decade, 66.8% are perpetrated by separatist groups, 14.1% by the left and right-wing groups, and only 16% by Islamic jihadists (Gill, 2020, p.43). These statistics are against the widely held assumptions that jihadists pose the biggest terrorist threat to the UK government and its citizens. For instance, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was believed to pose only a domestic problem, and their international activities widely ignored (Gill, 2017). PIRA’s domestic problems raised serious questions regarding its effectiveness in meeting some of its underlying objectives. The issue was whether PIRA was able to gather intelligence that is would use as part of its strategic efforts to combating any extremist activities. However, this was not the case considering that PIRA was a tightly run organization with a hierarchical system. Agencies failed in foiling their terrorist plots since they overlooked the group’s modes of operation, thus failing to cut their supply of weapons and funding. Understanding the structure and operations of terrorist groups is the primary technique in counterterrorism. 

The question of what constitutes intelligence failure is widely discussed in academic literature and by intelligence experts (Gibbs, 2018; Gill, 2020). The death of over 35 people in a terrorist attack in 2017 opened the discussion on failure and the ability of the intelligence community to prevent every terrorism plot on UK soil. Experts noted after the attack that future attacks are inevitable, and failure will certainly occur. Achieving a perfect standard in countering terrorism is far-fetched according to previous experience and the evolving nature of terrorism (Gill, 2020, p.48). Flawed expectations versus the need to provide safety for every citizen and the country’s assets put pressure on agencies to constantly improve their approach to intelligence gathering in their counterterrorism efforts. The new methods termed as “new terrorism” create the impetus for agencies to innovate (Onursal and Kirkpatrick, 2019, p.1). For instance, terrorists are likely to use knives or crude weapons in their attacks. It is extremely difficult or close to impossible to flag the purchase of such common items.

Another challenge for the intelligence community is bridging the gap between the expectation of policymakers and the level of protection that agencies can genuinely provide. Contrary to expectations by politicians and the media, agencies cannot achieve omnipresence; neither can they precisely predict future behaviors and actions of terrorists. These illegitimate expectations are largely to blame for the negative perceptions and labels of failure on intelligence bodies about counterterrorism. Glees (2015, p. 288) summarized justifications for intelligence failure as policy and leadership incompetence, analytical challenges leading to strategic and tactical failure, complications resulting from fragmented warning information, and organizational obstacles. The London transport System bombings in 2005 exposed the failings of the intelligence community due to their inability to prevent or gain information before the incident. Expert analysis after the attack pointed to agency incompetence, thus highlighting concerns about the capacity of the organizations to counter-terrorism. Previous failures in intelligence should provide learning experiences to avoid repeats. In the case of the M15 and M16, failures of the last decade have not caused sufficient policy change and improvements. (Burke, 2016, p.26). 

The United Kingdom is a free and open society; hence criticism over limits of intelligence is likely to receive wide publicity and media coverage (Burke, 2016, p. 28). The 2017 failures created bad publicity and scrutiny of the activities of agencies. By comparison, between 2013 and 2019, agencies thwarted 27 jihadist plots that would likely have resulted in significant damage (Gill, 2020, p.48). These revelations open questions of bias in analyzing the activities of intelligence bodies in official inquiries and literature. The question focused on whether intelligence bodies were well equipped to gather as much information as expected and whether they were ready to handle any underlying challenges likely to impact their effectiveness. Proponents of the intelligence bodies argue that terrorist attacks are bound to occur even with the best intelligence services due to the evolving nature of the vice and increased movement of people across borders (Gibbs, 2018). The cost of doing their job in a free society is people will seek accountability at all times, and the agencies must utilize the resources at their disposal to fulfill their mandate.

Research Aims

To examine the causes for and recurrence of the United Kingdom’s recent terrorist attacks intelligence failures. 

To evaluate the state of the present-day system besides determining if these failures are still unavoidable. 

To provide evidence-based recommendations to solve these problems.

Study Purpose

This study seeks to provide an extensive analysis of the recent limits of intelligence against terrorism. It demystifies the current justifications for the intelligence limits and aims to provide evidence-based solutions from literature and official inquiries. It asserts the possibility of attaining near-perfect ability by the intelligence community in countering terrorism even though this may present notable challenges. It will analyze the limits of intelligence that resulted in various terrorist attacks in the UK over the past two decades. More importantly, it aims to develop a deeper understanding of the country’s intelligence system and how it monitors terrorist activities through information gathering. As such, the gaps that exist in various bodies that contribute to failures will be identified with developing both short term and long-term solutions to the weaknesses. This research pays close attention to the differences between intelligence gaps, intelligence failure, and the limits of intelligence. Considering that the two phrases are used interchangeably in the media, this paper will explain the differences between the two and how they contribute to the UK intelligence community (Sfetcu, 2019). It considers the intelligence model used by UK agencies, including their strengths and limitations. Evidence shows that an unfit model will be ineffective for any intelligence purpose (Burke, 2016). The study thus considers whether the model is suitable for counterterrorism in the UK and its role in the apparent failures. The question of the target for the model is also considered to determine whether the methods applied in specific cases were flawed. 

Countering terrorist activities is a high stakes affair, and mistakes can have dire consequences. The intelligence process applied in various instances thus has to meet certain thresholds to increase the chances of success. In a country that has been previously the target of large-scale terrorist attacks, minimizing errors in intelligence activities is critical to achieving the intended goals. This study thus considers the [possibilities of agency errors in leading to failures. In a society where attention is mainly focused on Jihadi terrorists, there are the possibilities of increasing vulnerabilities due to the threat of other groups like right and left-wing extremists and the Irish Republican Army. The research will also explore failure related to these other groups. The focus will be on reasons for the recurrence of these failures and the need to avoid them in the future. As such, evidence-based solutions will be provided to guide policy and strategy in the future. 

Structure of the Study

This study is divided into five parts to offer clarity and flow of ideas. The first part covers the overreaching ideas of the topic and places context to the main idea of the research. Background of the intelligence community of the UK, including the various agencies that constitute these communities is provided. The purpose of the study and a clear statement of the problem that it aims to solve is also provided. A review of academic literature related to the topic then follows. Writings on counter-terrorism and previous research on intelligence failures are analysed. A body of academic knowledge of intelligence and counterterrorism is considered. A wide range of academic material is considered to derive the key points that will define this research. The methodology section then expands on the research objectives. It explains how the researcher operationalized the study. Data gathering and analysis methods applied by the researcher to meet the research objectives are explained. The results and findings provide a theoretical interpretation of the analysed data. The researcher relies on a body of academic knowledge to attach meaning to the reasons for failures identified in the previous chapter. This part answers the research question and offers a guide to the recommendations that the study will provide. The last chapter is a discussion of the findings and how they contribute to the aim of the study. The theories obtained in the previous section will be interpreted into evidence-based recommendations for the UK intelligence community. 

LITERATURE REVIEW

Academic literature dissecting topics on intelligence, including its limitations abound in academic journals and other relevant publications. The Madrid bombings in 2004, 2005 London terrorist attacks, and most importantly the 9/11 are some of the notable events that highlighted the risks of intelligence failure and the inability to act by government agencies (Gill and Phythian, 2018). As a result, the academic study of intelligence gathered pace over the last two years, as evidenced by the increase in graduate and undergraduate courses on intelligence studies as well as the emergence of related publications (Gill and Phythian, 2016, p. 5).

The Role of New Technologies

The greatest concern among stakeholders in the face of the current intelligence failures is whether agencies are changing and innovating enough to overcome the new security environment's obstacles. The old terrorist threats were slow-moving objects and puzzles that agencies must crack to prevent terrorism plots. The shift to the new technologies means the threat terrorists now operate in smaller groups with overlapping objectives with no permanent physical addresses (Wardlaw, 2015, p. 107). The London Transport System suicide bombings of 2005 and the 2017 attacks are evidence that the old methods are not completely gone (Gill and Phythian, 2016, 5-19). More importantly, UK intelligence bodies and their international counterparts are in consensus that they now greater risks of intelligence gaps emerging since terrorists are difficult to discern and can quickly move across borders (Wardlaw, 2015, p. 107). Gill and Phythian (2012) in Intelligence in an Insecure World, extensively explored the role of new technologies in intelligence failure, specifically the importance of Web 2.0 technologies and the media. 

Cyber technologies and internet penetration in the 21st Century mean that intelligence agencies operate in a significantly empowered civil society. Unlike in the previous decades, intelligence gathering and sharing are curtailed by democratic control in certain aspects (Gill and Phythian, 2012, p.57). The authors posited that criticism of the intelligence community is higher than ever experienced before with an even greater risk of loss of trust from the public due to constant scrutiny. The media's role in advancing the perception of intelligence is widely covered in the literature (Burke, 2016, p. 21; Gill and Phythian, 2012). Gill and Phythian explained that journalists and intelligence bodies previously existed in a symbiotic relationship where they would often meet and share information. The downside of the relation was that journalists were vulnerable to misinformation and spread of government propaganda. Advancement of technology, especially the advent of social media, now allows intelligence bodies to bypass mainstream media in gathering and distribution of information. Burke (2016) noted that the criticism that the intelligence community faces today is mainly due to the amplification of the media. As such, new technologies have shifted the relationship between journalists and intelligence bodies from mutual dependence to instances where some of the journalists become hostile as they seek information to use on their media reports. 

Discussions on the level of risks that nuclear technologies pose to the UK when acquired by terrorist groups are not given the amount of attention that they deserve, as observed by Werbos (2017, p.42). Nuclear proliferation in the face of the current intelligence capabilities in not only the UK but other European countries possesses the greatest threat to the public. Intelligence agencies often face worrying about the possibility of a 'dirty bomb,' which is likely to have immense impacts when not stopped well in advance or prevented from actually going off. Gathering intelligence about terrorist groups operating in hostile nations in the Middle East is an uphill task for intelligence agencies (Gill, 2020). The chances of discerning the plans of such extremist groups in the face of the current nuclear weapons ownership confusion are worryingly low. Of even greater concern is that terrorists attack using nuclear weapons would certainly result in devastating economic, humanitarian, political, and environmental consequences (Brill and Bernhard, 2015, p.16). The author further noted that governments could not be certain that terrorists cannot acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons hence remain in the dark about the repercussions of such an occurrence.

Zegart and Morell (2019, p.91), in their analysis of the vulnerabilities of modern technologies to terrorist attacks, highlighted the possibility of new methods that current technology cannot prevent. They termed these forms of attack as “Cyberblitzkrieg” where the attacker utilizes unknown tools in terrorist acts (Werbos, 2017, p.53). Sandboxing and other extrusion detection tools are widely used in the cybersecurity industry to detect and prevent attacks. The author, however, posited that the current methods are unlikely to offer protection against a coordinated “Cyberblitzkrieg” act. In events that terrorists access sensitive government information, intelligence agencies will be stepping behind in gathering information that can prevent an attack. 

Burke (2016) explored the role of analysts in intelligence and how the analysis deal with uncertainty. The paper provides insights into the challenges of intelligence and the extensive data that intelligence bodies have to check to come up with substantive information. The author suggests that terrorism should be handled differently since it is increasingly becoming a major concern for governments and public safety. His exploration of previous research on the topic, such as Gabbard & Treverton (2008), provides multiple solutions to the analytic and uncertainty problem in intelligence. They suggested a joint approach to the analysis problem that would include professionals from different but related agencies. For instance, an analyst from one agency should be able to utilize the facilities of another agency without interfering. These conceptual recommendations, however, require a higher degree of trusts that lack in the current intelligence community setup. The role of uncertainty or its communication does not receive the level of attention it deserves (Dhami, 2018, 256). At the same time, there is consensus that a degree of uncertainty is inherent in intelligence gathering and communication; heterogeneity of language in communicating uncertainty remains a problem. Although there are standardized lexicons used in this form of communication, professionals are likely to use phrases in a different form than the intended message to be communicated. As such, miscommunication emerges as a significant problem in intelligence that can have deleterious effects on decision making (Zegart, 2007, p.172; Sheptycki, 2004, p.11). 

Papers by Jervis (2006) and Aldrich (2009) provided a dissection of the intelligence failures of the past decade in the UK. Jervis highlighted as limitations in analyses, which cause a mismatch between the kind of information available for agencies to act and the actual information that becomes available once the attack has occurred. Poor intelligence gathering or incompetence in the analysis are the likely causes of such failures in the intelligence community. The second form of intelligence failure highlighted by Jarvis is what is usually reported in the media. Due to high expectations by the public as projected in the media, intelligence agencies fail to meet such expectations hence are viewed to have failed in public opinion. The interchangeable use of the words intelligence gap and intelligence failure in the media is largely to blame for the wrong perception of the public. Genuine intelligence failure has been underlined by public inquiries into terrorist attacks, such as the 2005 attacks in London (Aldrich, 2009, p.229). With increased scrutiny on intelligence agencies, it becomes much harder for these agencies to undertake their respective duties in ensuring to collect as much information as possible. The challenge is that they often face the risk of public inquiries, which often raises questions about some of the methods that these agencies employ as they gather intelligence reports. 

Intelligence and Security Committees

An Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) report into the 2005 London attacks provides valuable insights into the intelligence-gathering process and its impact on intelligence success or failure. The report aimed to determine if crucial intelligence information was missed or overlooked before the 2005 attacks (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006, p.6). Intelligence experts who testified to the committee admitted that a voluptuous amount of information on terrorism is received by agencies who then dedicate a considerable amount of resources to cover even a single target. The report further notes that before the attacks, the number of targets in the UK was approximately 800, and agencies were only capable of covering a percentage. Due to limitations of resources, agencies have to profile targets into essential, desirable, and others hence pursue leads that they consider real threats at the time. As such, there always exists a possibility of attacks being planned by terrorists without the knowledge of agencies. 

On the question of intelligence failure, the committee identified several factors that led to intelligence agencies' failure to identify the attackers as posing an immediate threat to security. Only two of the attackers were on the radar of intelligence officers but incorrectly identified as planning attacks in Pakistan and other international money fraud suspicion (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006, p.16). Agents were aware of the meeting between the two attackers before the events of July 7, 2005, but considering their profiling as others means that resources were directed to other priority targets. The committee concluded that the presence of other plans by terrorists to attack the UK and resource limitations for investigative agencies were the major contributing factors to the inability of the intelligence community to foil the attacks. As such, intelligence gaps were the primary reasons for the tragic attacks. 

Definitions of intelligence failure again emerged in the debate on if British intelligence agencies could do more to pre-empt the London attacks. Clews (2013) argued that the incident should never be considered an intelligence failure since agencies lacked adequate resources to deal with the already existing Islamic terrorist threat. In hindsight, the attacks impacted positively on the intelligence-gathering process by forcing the government to channel more resources towards the intelligence community. The alternative definition, which terms intelligence failure as part of warning failure, however, contradicts Clews’ assertions. Two of the bombers were under the surveillance of agencies, although they were not priority targets due to resource constraints. As such, there was intelligence failure at the collection and analysis of information, which constitutes the overall failure of the intelligence community in executing its mandate. The Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) rejected this line of argument by asserting that failure should be considered in line with existing policies. The policies at the time did not provide agencies adequate resources to effectively and efficiently undertake their duties; hence the inability to collect information about the two attackers does not amount to intelligence failure. 

A detailed follow-up Intelligence and Security Committee report into the 2005 London attacks produced in 2009 produced focused on determining whether there was intelligence failure on the part of the agencies. The Committee utilized intelligence experts to decipher whether the Secret Service (M15) acted efficiently in identifying the lead bomber and the extent of the threat he and his colleagues posed on British security. The report detailed that M15 agents utilized eavesdropping devices to monitor another essential target who was in contact with the lead bomber. They noticed that the terrorists discussed bomb-making, but only details related to the essential target were considered since the lead bomber of the 2005 attacks was not profiled as essential (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2009, p.34). The final report reiterated the findings of the initial report that analysis of the information was extremely resource-consuming and focusing all target hints that agencies received was practically impossible. 

Another intelligence and Security Committee (2014) provides valuable information on the motives of lone terrorist attacks. The incident under investigation involved British officer Fusilier Lee Rigby, who was run down by a van by two assailants who attacked him with weapons. The two terrorists were in seven different agency investigations related to contact with extremist groups, the use of extremist language on the internet, and other extremist views (Rifkind, 2014). Notably, the report suggests that agencies took a keen interest in the two attackers’ interest in joining Islamic extremist groups operating overseas while ignoring the domestic threat that they posed. The previous failures, especially in 2005, seemingly did not provide sufficient learning experiences for agencies while investigating individuals linked to terrorist attacks. As Rifkind (2014) correctly noted, intelligence agencies should be blamed for only identifying crucial details of the terrorist’s plans after they had already executed the terrorist acts. 

The Manchester Arena attack, London Bridge Attack, Westminster attack formed the basis of the Intelligence and Security Committee (2018) report into the 2017 attacks. The investigation into the Westminster attack found that the terrorist had been under investigation by the Secret Service since 2010 (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2018, p.64). While his phone number had appeared in a different investigation in 2004, it was not until six years later that he was officially identified. Similarly, the perpetrators of the two other attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 had been actively investigated by the agencies, but their categorization was reduced. These flaws, as noted by critics, directly contributed to the 2017 events, which would otherwise be avoidable if agencies had closely monitored the activities of the terrorist. Again, questions of strategy and tactics emerged as key issues in the manner that British agencies undertook their counterintelligence work. In all the three attacks in 2017, there was certainly no strategic failure since agencies collected information about their attackers and accomplices on time to prevent the attacks. Tactical failure involves situations where agencies are aware that certain groups or individuals are planning attacks but are uncertain about the locations and methods of attack (Burke, 2016, p, 115). Failure to correctly analyse intelligence information and come up with conclusive answers about their activities of the terrorist was the main factor leading to the outcomes. While piecing together intelligence information regarding the activities of terrorists is a complex task, the 2017 attacks amount to intelligence failure by agencies (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2018, p.65).

Limits of Intelligence

Conceptualizing the limits of intelligence under the British intelligence community's current setup is critical to identifying the causes of intelligence failure and how it affects current and future intelligence processes. Gill and Phythian's (2016, p. 5) analysis provides a comprehensive analysis of the limits of intelligence and how it affects the direction of intelligence gathering. Intelligence gathering is not an entirely complete solution to the terrorism problem; therefore, it should not be viewed as a clear and comprehensive predictor of future security. Limits in intelligence dictate that agencies will always find it difficult to identify all threats before they happen, thus underlining the importance of other government bodies and citizen cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. The situation is best demonstrated by the agency's efforts before the 2005 attacks in London. The Secret Service at the time appeared to efficiently identify critical terrorist threats and undertake efforts to prevent the terrorist from executing their plans. Two of the bombers were, however, profiled as not an essential threat hence the agency’s failure to closely monitor their activities as they invested their resources in other targets that posed an immediate threat (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006, p.16). Considering that terrorists work in high secrecy, the ability of agencies to obtain information that leads to the thwarting of their plans is itself a complex task. 

Terrorists are aware of British signal intelligence operations hence strive as much as possible to limit their activities through channels that might create exposure (Clews, 2013). They use a variety of deception techniques and utilize the knowledge of various professionals and experts to hide their activities. Indeed, the threat of terrorism on British soil kept expanding after the London 2005 attacks, forcing agencies to devote more resources to counterterrorism efforts. When put into perspective, the Secret Services increased its counterterrorism resources to about 75% of the agency’s total allocation for 2009, signifying an increase of 10% for that year alone (Andrew, 2010, p.835). Despite the extra-ordinary resource allocation, there is still no guarantee that all terrorist threats in the UK will be identified and eliminated. As noted by Gill and Phythian (2016, p. 5), intelligence is not the ultimate solution due to the limits such as government policy and the constantly changing tactics and deceptions employed by terrorists.

In the context of limits in intelligence, agencies face a significant challenge of differences in ideological approach to counterterrorism as employed by the British government. A significant percent, 18% of British Muslims felt that the government applied an incorrect or oppressive method of dealing with the terrorism problem (Phythian 2008, p. 52). Agencies need the support of communities and citizens to identify suspicious terrorist threats; hence the lack of poses major concerns in counterterrorism efforts. Phythian (2008) further noted that second and third-generation Muslims are increasingly feelings alienated by society hence driving the community intelligence effort in a negative direction. Similar opinions were shared by Lynch (2013, p.42), who asserted that the political rhetoric after the July seventh attack by pitting the British values, cultures, and way of life against the Islamic ideologies. By constructing the terrorism threat as an Islamic threat, the leaders implied that Britain Muslim communities were to blame for the problem. The result was the further alienation of Muslim communities hence preventing corporation between a significant portions of these communities with intelligence agencies. 

Discussions on intelligence failure also focus on the role of radicalization within the country's borders. Radicalization and extremism are critical; aspects of terrorism with the youth at a precarious position in the entanglement. The term "homegrown terrorism" emerged after the 7/7 attacks about the British citizenship of the bombers (Lynch, 2013, p.42). The proliferation of radicalisation agents who work through the internet exacerbates the problem since they are difficult to track and apprehend. Surprisingly, the Intelligence and Security Committee report failed to adequately address the radicalization problem among young people and its contribution to Islamic terrorism. Undoubtedly, the nature of the threat is shifting in the manner in which Muslims are radicalized, from Mosques and homes to premium places (Clews, 2013). As more of the young people become radicalized, intelligence agencies have to input more resources in monitoring the spread and neutralizing these ideologies. The chances of intelligence failure thus increase since agencies will be dealing with an expanded threat that can easily camouflage within the population. 

As highlighted by Clews (2019), intelligence failures of varying degrees are apparent in the way the British intelligence community undertakes its operations. Brill and Bernhard (2015, p.18) corroborate these observations in their view that failures at different levels are responsible for the recent terrorist attacks. Failures in collecting and analysis of intelligence information have been covered is a vast majority of the literature reviewed in this section. Communication of dissemination of intelligence information is given the least attention in intelligence literature (Dhami, 2018, p. 256). Failure in collection and analysis of intelligence is experienced by other intelligence agencies in Europe and the US, but there are specific failures that literature levels on British intelligence. Clews (2019) observed that British intelligence was complacent through its slow identification of the radicalization of Muslims in Britain. It emerged that the young Muslims were radicalized in Britain then traveled to other countries to receive training before returning to perpetrate terrorist acts.

METHODOLOGY

This study employed both primary and secondary sources of information. The primary sources are newspaper reports of terrorist attacks for the period covered in this study as well as Intelligence and Security Committee reports covering investigations into the major terrorist attacks in the UK. The newspaper reports are obtained from internet sources and various reliable news websites. The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Independent, Daily Mirror, The Sun among others are some of the reliable news sites that this research relied on to access first-hand information about the terrorist attacks, how the events unfolded, and the response immediately after the attacks. Considering the focus of the study being intelligence failure, reports on how intelligence agencies perceived the security situation before and after the attack will form the bulk of the information for the study. Caution was paramount to avoid personal opinions about intelligence, but rather the researcher focused on expert analysis of the situation. 

Materials contained in the Intelligence and Security Committee reports were provided by various government departments and intelligence experts. The reports are public records of inquiries into the terrorist attacks for the covered period hence provide an accurate and concise record of intelligence agencies covered investigations before, during, and after the investigations. A bulk of the information was obtained from these official reports since they provide detailed, unbiased, and conclusive investigations of the role of the intelligence community in preventing terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the reports provide details of expert reviews intelligence work concerning the attacks. A chronological record of events related to the attack offers useful information for analysis to determine the levels of intelligence failures related to the terrorist attacks. Additionally, the government reports allow for comparison concerning the similarities and differences between the attacks for the period. A bulk of declassified information relating to inquiries into attacks in the UK is now in the public domain. The information thus provides the basis for deeper analysis and decision making related to counterterrorism.

Secondary sources utilised for this research include peer-reviewed articles exploring the counterterrorism efforts related to various attacks in the US. The articles are especially useful in understanding the strategic decisions that underpin intelligence efforts in the UK. As such, it is imperative to exceed a single academic discourse in acquiring crucial data on how intelligence studies scholars perceive the strategy applied by intelligence agencies and how it affects policy and decision making. The theories that define the previous and current counterterrorism efforts and how it relates to the overall topic of intelligence failure emerges as a special interest in this research. The theories with then are analysed to determine their specific relations to intelligence.

The framing of the research questions was aimed at providing an objective approach in achieving the purpose of the study. Objectivity, in this case, is arrived at by avoiding explicit assumptions by approaching the topic with a neutral connotation. In interpretive research, there is the risk of the researcher's knowledge and opinions derailing the purpose of the research. The researcher should, therefore, aim to eliminate personal bias by developing an objective approach in meeting the research purpose. The qualitative research paradigm is premised on the understanding that the researcher is not separate from the topic of research, hence making it necessary for interaction between the researcher and the researched knowledge (Cresswell et al., 2006, p. 2). The interaction thus becomes a source of bias that can derail the research if the researcher is not careful to separate personal opinions from explicit knowledge and facts on the topic. In hindsight, this researcher undertook an extensive literature review of the intelligence failure topic. They considered the information provided in both primary and secondary sources to develop a deeper understanding of UK intelligence and failure.

The knowledge is critical in developing an interpretive approach to the study. Interpretive research is significantly shaped by social contexts and the experiences of individuals as opposed to having a singular approach (Berg and Lune, 2004, p. 243). As such, the topic of intelligence failure is best studied under the socio-historic context by relying on the interpretations of participants; in this case, intelligence experts and intelligence studies scholars. Berg and Lune (2004, p.243) further noted that "interpretive researchers view social reality as being embedded within and impossible to abstract from their social settings" hence they strive to make sense of the topic through abstract thinking rather than hypothesis testing. This is unlike the positivist paradigm, which tries to explain reality as independent of the social context. In the context of the intelligence failure topic, an interpretive approach is preferable since it approaches the topic from the context of the intelligence experts and policymakers. While observers may place an unbounded meaning to an intelligence failure, only a deeper look at the events and contexts can determine whether the attacks amounted to failures. As such, the official investigative reports, newspaper reports, and intelligence studies by scholars provide the most reliable information for the study.

ANALYSIS

Defining Intelligence Failure

Defining intelligence is among the initial steps in understanding and developing a concise definition of intelligence failure in the context of British intelligence. Intelligence gathering is a traditional practice that has existed for millennia, but there exists no single agreed-upon definition of intelligence. Burke (2016) argues that most definitions of intelligence range from broad to narrow depending on the specific interest of the agency. He gives the example that defining intelligence as the process of finding out the secrets of others qualifies as a core principle of the process but does not suffice as a definition. A broader definition of intelligence covers the entire process from collection of information, analysis to dissemination. The narrow definitions, on the other hand, focuses on the process of collecting information without making follow-ups on how the information is used. Burke (2016) appraised definitions that cover the three sections of descriptive, current reportorial, and speculative emulative as more complete as compared to the others. The descriptive part covers the actual groundwork that agencies undertake in their daily duties. Current-reportorial tracks the changes related to intelligence; hence agents have to stay updated. The speculative-emulative component covers the ability of the agents and agencies to evaluate the collected data for hints.

Another critical factor in defining intelligence is whether open-source intelligence (OSINT) should be included as part of the wider intelligence spectrum. Proponents for inclusion argue that OSINT is part of the critical decision-making process, especially with the advent of social media; hence this component cannot be ignored (Marzell, 2016, p.33). Counterarguments are that OSINT already exists in the public domain and attempts to conceal it may be futile hence should not form part of the definition. When put into context, OSINT plays a critical role in the manner the public perceives the intelligence process hence should not be excluded from the definition due to its significance to the overall intelligence process. In developing a working definition of intelligence for this paper, the researcher focused on three key characteristics; structure, process, and product as well as the definitions developed by various agencies and intelligence studies scholars. The structure is the intelligence bodies with the British intelligence community which undertake the intelligence work. The process involves collecting information, analysing and dissemination to create interventions. The product covers the output of the whole process, which is the profile of the terrorists of the tactical intervention. As such, intelligence is the covertly acquired information that is processed, analysed, interpreted, and disseminated to ensure the safety of the UK. 

Developing a succinct definition of intelligence failure demands an in-depth analysis of the causes of failure and the way they are viewed by experts in the field. Pythian (2008, p. 203) defined intelligence failure as a misunderstanding of intelligence information which causes agencies to take actions that are either counterproductive or inappropriate for the situation. The definition, however, was deemed limiting by various scholars, including Burke (2016, p. 81). He noted that the definition fails to include information that was already in possession by intelligence bodies, but for their failure to make the right connection that leads to useful conclusions, attacked occurred. As such, analysing the causes of intelligence failure provides a basis for developing a definition that encompasses all possible situations.

Intelligence Studies

As the study of intelligence grows apace, understanding what constitutes “Intelligence Studies” is imperative in developing a coherent approach to the topic of intelligence failure. Marrin (2016, p.266) suggested that intelligence studies are developing theories, ideas, and strategies that complement the work of security agencies. Gill and Phythian (2016) however, argued that intelligence studies should not limit themselves to complementing professional intelligence practice but rather should project itself to a larger audience and provide solutions that apply to all areas of society. Considering the dynamic nature of intelligence gathering and analysis, improvements in the UK, and its allies' understanding of intelligence, there is now a greater salience for academic literature on intelligence. These assertions were reiterated by Burke (2016), who suggested that the current wealth of resource materials produced in academia is valuable in various intelligence systems. He further noted that the disconnect in information sharing between academics and intelligence as a contributing factor to the recurrent intelligence failures witnessed in the UK (Burke, 2016, p.45). Intelligence agencies fail to share the intelligence gathered with academics, which becomes an issue of concern when trying to maximize efficiency in the use of intelligence reports to minimize risks of terrorist attacks. Another revealing aspect of intelligence studies is the role of non-state intelligence was highlighted by Gill and Phythian (2012). Studies, such as Gill and Phythian and Kurke, now aim to dissect how intelligence is practiced at different levels and how this existing formation affect or limit intelligence gathering. 

Interestingly, the tensions between academics and practice in intelligence have received attention from various scholars (Gill and Phythian, 2016, p.12, Kurke, 2016). Despite the crucial need for mutual learning and sharing of information between the two crucial sections to drive policy and innovations, there is an existing disconnect. In hindsight, practitioners need academics to provide solutions to the limits of current limitations through research and analysis (Bures, 2016, p.57). Current suggest points to the need for intelligence agencies to consider the services of intelligence studies scholars and the specialist knowledge that other professionals add to the intelligence-gathering process (Gill and Phythian, 2016). Under the current circumstances, the collaboration between academia and intelligence professionals is still at the infancy stage hence created the need for a deeper look into the relevance of research and analysis in intelligence.

RESULTS

The evaluation of primary and secondary sources highlights a clear challenge in the UK’s intelligence community contributing to an underlying issue in which the community fails to provide the required information to prevent possible attacks. The sources also point to a challenge resulting from oversight of the intelligence machinery operating as part of the intelligence community. The main issue of concern is that most of the intelligence agencies, such as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Security Service (MI5), and Defence Intelligence (DI), find themselves in a dilemma as they gather information because most of the information they cannot be validated in time as a way of preventing possible attacks (Hough and Jacobs, 2010, p.99). Additionally, increased bureaucracy within the different agencies acts as a key issue of concern resulting in a situation where the agencies fail to share necessary information when needed. Although the role of these agencies is to provide necessary caution before an attack, they find themselves experiences serious limitations affecting their performance.

Findings

An in-depth evaluation of the different sources highlights that intelligence failure is one of the most significant problems that the UK faces today as it combats terrorism. The main issue of concern is that the intelligence community in the country presents several notable shortcomings, some of which expose the country to clear security threats (Davies, 2004, p.499). The UK government has been at the forefront in ensuring that adequate resources are directed towards its intelligence architecture. The basic expectation is that this would help establish a clear avenue through which to maximize the set security standards to guarantee improved security outcomes. However, the country's intelligence architecture presents several glaring failures, which terrorist groups are using to their advantage as they plan and carry out attacks in different parts of the country. Understanding these shortcomings is the first step to ensuring that the country would enhance its control of the intelligence community to deliver on its intended purpose (Zegart, 2012, p.23).

The July 7, 2005 bombings in the UK were a clear testament to the fact that the intelligence architecture in the country was failing in achieving its intended goal, which is to enhance security for the people. Immediately after these bombings, what was most notable was the public statement by the intelligence community indicating that it did not have a warning of the plot to conduct the attacks (Betts, 2002, p.50). The UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, indicated that the intelligence machinery had not received intelligence reports that were specific to the bombings that would have helped in preventing the onslaught by the two bombers. On its part, MI5 noted that the persons identified as having carried out the attacks were "not on the radar," which meant that the intelligence service was not considering them as a threat to national security.

Using these bombings as an example of intelligence failure, it is evident that the country finds itself in a challenging scenario because the intelligence services, which are meant to provide prior information, fail to create the whole picture that would be used to prevent possible attacks. Most of the intelligence agencies operate in a disjointed manner where it becomes hard for multiple agencies to share any information that they would have on a suspect (Byman, 2014, p.849). Therefore, if one agency was looking into a suspect, they would not share such information with other agencies considering the disjointed nature of the intelligence community. The outcome of such cases is that many of the persons that conduct successful terror attacks in the UK fall through investigative gaps where it becomes hard for the agencies involved to determine their roles before an attack (McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak, 2007, p.148). Generally, this shows that the country is dealing with a serious security threat considering the underlying challenges within its intelligence community.

Another important aspect to note from the evaluation of the different sources is that many of the intelligence agencies are under-staffed; thus, meaning that they do not have the human resources to pursue all significant investigative targets. In some of the attacks conducted across the UK, it was noted that intelligence agencies had these suspects in their sights but had not scrutinized them effectively (Bamford, 2005, p.600). The main reason for this is that these agencies handle a lot of cases where they need to evaluate possible targets for terrorist attacks, scrutinize individuals depending on their terror links, and determine who is most likely to conduct an attack. The limitation in human resources means that the intelligence community finds itself at a disadvantage because it becomes much harder to evaluate each target or individual depending on the nature of the threats posed.

This has led to instances where some of the agencies, including MI5 and SIS, having a relatively narrow focus as they try to prevent possible terror attacks as opposed to having a distributed wider terrorist network. The issue of concern is that the threshold for possible attacks is significant while the number of investigations conducted is limited, which means that many of the possible cases identified are not investigated to determine their possible links to terror attacks (Scott and Hughes, 2006, p.666). On the other hand, many of the police departments across the UK are unwilling to engage themselves in conducting investigations touching on complex-terrorism cases that they come across. The police departments view this as a distraction in their primary objective, which is to engage in community policing as opposed to focusing on terrorism. Intelligence agencies argue that such failures by law enforcement departments to work together constitutes an overall failure because it highlights shows the possibility of terror cells engaging in planning without the knowledge of any agency.

Most of the intelligence collection methods used by intelligence agencies across the UK are expensive and man-power intensive, which means that having a limited number of staff becomes an issue when gathering as much information as possible. In an example, the MI5 conducted an operation targeting Mohammad Siddique Khan, who was the mastermind of the July 7, 2005 bombings. During this operation, the main intelligence methods used were direct surveillance and bugging his private residence with the objective being to gather as much information as possible. However, MI5 abandoned this operation because of a limited number of staff; thus, did not have a clear intelligence picture around this particular individual. The agency redirected its resources to other targets with the view being that this was a low-level target (Davis, 2007, p.173). The outcome was that Khan was involved in one of the deadliest terror attacks in the history of the UK.

The case of Khan and information from the different sources highlights another key limitation of intelligence in the country, which is that most of the agencies focus their attention on the techniques as opposed to the targets. In the example of Khan, if MI5 has placed much of its attention on him, as a target, it would have engaged in a reassessment of his security threat provided it has access to additional information. Instead, MI5 focused on the techniques it used and the cost associated with gathering such intelligence; thus, resulting in the glaring mistake leading up to the bombings (Johnson, 2003, p.16). The key issue, in this case, was the fact that MI5 opted to abandon an operation they considered as being of low value to law enforcement without having to evaluate the target thoroughly. If the agency had evaluated the target, they would have noted that he had been involved in terrorist training activities in the Middle East, which meant that he posed a serious security threat to the country. Intelligence agencies often fail to consider the value of a target as they engage in intelligence gathering. Instead, they often consider the cost and resources that they would use on a specific operation, which, in some cases, is not viable.

Intelligence agencies in the UK are failing in their bid to undertaking a community intelligence approach as they evaluate targets, which would mean working with multiple agencies to gain as much information as possible. For most of these agencies, the focus is on the idea that they must work in unison as part of their strategy to ensuring they deliver on their set outcome, which is to prevent a possible attack. There exists a clear gap in communication between different agencies although they work towards a similar goal, which is to prevent attacks against the UK. Communication is an important aspect of consideration in intelligence gathering because it places more emphasis on the need to ensure that much of the information is presented in a manner that would guide law enforcement departments (Laqueur, 2003, p.56). The gap in communication exists because most of the information shared often lacks a broader context in which to apply, which makes it hard for the agencies to determine whether indeed a person has been involved in any form of planning of a terror attack against the UK.

That exposes another failure by the intelligence community in the UK, which is that there are institutional divisions that serve as an impediment in capitalizing on intelligence sharing among the different agencies involved. One of the key areas of failure noted from different sources is that most of the intelligence agencies often seem to work independently, which means that the amount of information they share with other agencies is often limited. The development of a well-rounded intelligence community is important in ensuring that the country would maximize its ability to deliver on some of its set security goals (Coyne, 2014, p.15). For example, this would mean that the agencies involved would understand their value in sharing information that they consider valuable as they examine the different targets. No single agency can provide adequate intelligence reports without working with another agency; hence, the need for policymakers to come up with security legislations that would allow different agencies to work together irrespective of what is expected of them.

When examining the issue relating to communication failure between the agencies, it can be noted that each agency operates within its own set of objectives, which is an oversight in maximizing overall delivery efforts in intelligence gathering. Additionally, each of the agencies has its own IT infrastructure that it uses as part of information gathering, which also presents a major challenge when it comes to information sharing. In many cases, one agency may be conducting an investigation on an individual it considers relevant while another agency focuses on another individual (Copeland, 2007, p.59). The effectiveness of the intelligence agencies would only be defined based on their ability to work together to deliver on a single goal, which is to ensure that they prevent attacks before they take place. Advanced technology may be of value in creating a joined-up intelligence system that can work for multiple agencies, which avoids instances where their operations overlap; thus, causing any conflict. 

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies, as well as, with other law enforcement agencies may mean that despite some of the hurdles the agencies are experiencing, they would most likely maximize the overall security structure. The agencies would be in a much better position to provide necessary information to be used to prevent possible attacks likely to have devastating impacts on the UK population (Field, 2009, p.1001). Intelligence agencies need to recognize that they have an important role to play in securing the country, especially considering that the information and intelligence they provide would be used to take control of the security situation. Lack of cooperation between the agencies leads to missed opportunities to develop an intelligence picture that would be of value in thwarting a possible attack or would help in identifying terrorist supporters, which is equally an important step in advancing overall security outcomes. The findings show clear gaps that intelligence agencies need to consider as they embark on a process to enhance their capacity to protect the UK population from possible attacks.

DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Intelligence has played a key role in thwarting a vast array of terrorist activities all across the United Kingdom by providing necessary information used in preventing an attack before it occurs. For a long time, intelligence gathering has been of great value in the country's approach to law enforcement because it has meant that law enforcement agencies have access to required information for them to act accordingly. However, it is equally important to consider that the intelligence community also exhibits serious failures, which have led to terror attacks in the country. Examining such attacks is important because it serves as a guide to help facilitate effectiveness for the different agencies (Rudner, 2009, p.119). The findings of the study take note of the fact that intelligence failure occurs as a direct outcome of failure within the intelligence community to maximize its position and relevance in information gathering. The outcome is that most of the agencies involved in intelligence gathering often fail to deliver on the expectation, which is to enhance security in the country. 

Summary of Findings

The evaluation of the findings, as has been conducted in the previous section, exposes several key areas where the intelligence community is failing thereby leading to the country's exposure to terrorism. The first area noted was on the fact that many of the agencies cannot gather intelligence due to limited resources, especially human resources. An in-depth evaluation of the agencies involved in intelligence gathering indicates that they present several key challenges because it becomes hard for them to evaluate each of the targets they consider viable as they conduct their investigations (Chalk, 2020, p.22). The outcome of such cases is that most of those involved in successful terror attacks in the UK slip through the investigative gaps. In some cases, intelligence agencies argue that the persons involved are usually “not on the radar.” Therefore, many of these agencies find themselves lacking any prior information immediately after an attack has taken place, which points to an overall failure.

The second finding was on the fact that intelligence agencies in the UK operate in a disjointed manner where each agency operates independently as opposed to working together. The key issue of concern when working in a disjointed manner is that it becomes much harder for the agencies to share information that would be relevant to prevent a possible attack (Mitchell, 2006, p.152). The third finding was that most of the agencies have a relatively narrow focus as they work towards preventing terror attacks. Investigations are often limited to those persons or targets that they consider as being of high value to the intelligence community, which serves as a clear indication of failure on the part of the agencies. It is expected that intelligence agencies would engage in a distributed wider intelligence network, which would allow them to net persons that they consider being of high value. However, this is not the case considering the limitations in resources and lack of a clear strategy on how to meet some of these outcomes.

Discussion

The dynamics of intelligence are changing in the real world, which is fast becoming more complex for intelligence agencies as they embark on a process aimed at enhancing their ability to gather the information that would help prevent possible attacks. The changing dynamics present several opportunities for the agencies involved because it provides them with a new avenue to enhance their capacities to gather viable information (Cassara, 2006, p.78). The assertion that intelligence is all about information gathering is changing because the agencies involved need to determine the value of the information they gather and its importance in promoting security. However, the changing intelligence environment also introduces a vast array of challenges that contribute to cases of intelligence failure. The analysis of different sources and terror cases, across the UK, have highlighted a clear gap resulting from intelligence leading up to increased possibilities of terrorist attacks. Interestingly, the UK has invested heavily in intelligence but faces the most notable terror threats when compared to any other country in Europe.

Despite the government's efforts to invest in intelligence, one of the greatest issues that it is facing as it seeks to revamp its intelligence community is a clear disconnect between the different agencies mandated with intelligence collection. The UK has several intelligence agencies, which operate within the same intelligence community environment, allowing them to gather as much information on possible targets or individuals likely to have a link to terrorism (Shaffer, 2015, p.360). It is expected that the agencies would operate uniformly to enhance their capacity to gather necessary intelligence that would be used to thwart possible attacks on the UK. However, this is not the case considering that the country still finds itself dealing with terror attacks, some of which have had serious implications on the country. That serves as a clear indication of failure within the intelligence community that is having far-reaching implications on the country's security structure.

Many of the failures within intelligence agencies are driven by inefficient legislation and policies on how these agencies should operate and how they should ensure to deliver their respective goals. The glaring failures noted in the agencies serve as an indication of the fact that the agencies work in competition with each other as opposed to working together. Working in competition means that the agencies would not be willing to share any information that they have on potential targets or individuals likely to plan and execute terror attacks against the UK (Clarke and Soria, 2009, p.51). That becomes an issue of concern when the intelligence community, which is expected to serve as the frontline for the security apparatus in the country, is caught flat-footed after an attack. That was the case in the July 7, 2005 bombings where the intelligence community admitted to lacking any information on the planning and execution of the attacks.

Legislators and security experts in the UK need to come up with a different approach as they work towards creating a new structure of performance for the intelligence community, especially focusing on its operations across the different intelligence spectrums. The whole idea is to revamp the intelligence agencies to ensure that they work towards a similar goal or objective. Additionally, this is an approach aimed at ensuring that the agencies come up with different strategies that would be of value in advancing their efforts to share information amongst themselves. The leadership within the different agencies must also show a sense of commitment towards working together with the view being to change the perception held against the intelligence community (Dumbrell, 2006, p.461). Most people across the UK believed that the intelligence community is not as effective as may be expected in thwarting possible terror attacks, which becomes a security issue of concern for the majority.

With the country facing increased terror threats, it is becoming much more important for the UK to revamp its security services to accommodate new strategies and structures, especially within its intelligence community. The objective is to create a new standard through which the government would create an enhanced security framework guiding how the different agencies operate. It is within the mandate for the government to address this issue by highlighting the negative implications associated with having a disjointed intelligence community where multiple agencies work towards achieving their individual goals (Dobson, 2019, p.319). That calls for the leadership within the different intelligence agencies to establish coordinated efforts that would ensure their agencies work together to improve their intelligence gathering approaches. Additionally, this would also mean that the existing investigative gaps are sealed to avoid instances where persons, who have possible links to terrorism, are not investigated before they plan and execute an attack against the UK.

On the other hand, the UK government needs to underpin its commitment towards the intelligence community through increased funding to the different agencies to allow them to invest in adequate resources. One of the key challenges noted is that many of the intelligence agencies are operating without the expected number of staff, who play a central role in undertaking the different activities associated with the agencies' objective (Walker, 2005, p.411). For example, the agencies require an adequate number of analysts and case officers to ensure that they can evaluate and scrutinize each individual thoroughly. In some of the cases that highlight intelligence failure, the most notable aspect is that the agencies involved did not have the staffing capacity to allow them to evaluate the different individuals. Ultimately, this leads to a situation where the agencies often ignore persons, who end up wreaking havoc against the UK. 

Increased funding towards the intelligence agencies would mean that they would develop a much wide network allowing them to gather as much information as possible. Additionally, this would also mean that the agencies would have the necessary capacity to evaluate each piece of information they gather depending on the nature of the threat that the country is experiencing. The long-term effect is that this will act as a guarantee that the number of thwarted attacks will increase significantly (Irons, 2008, p.16). The UK government must also create training and development programs for police departments across the country, who have an important role in community policing. Many of the police departments do not have the capacity or ability to conduct terrorism-related investigations and often rely on the information provided by intelligence agencies. In many cases, this is not as effective as may be expected because a lack of police engagement means that the intelligence agencies do not operate effectively.

The main objective of the intelligence agencies is to maximize efforts regarding the gathering of informative intelligence that enables the security systems to deal with any threat. Communication failure is one of the issues that hinder the ability of the agencies to achieve their objectives considering that most agencies engage in individual efforts to gather information without consulting with other agencies. The development of an effective communication strategy among agencies is important as it helps to share ideas on how to undertake different challenges that concern gathering intelligence (Silke, 2004, p.56). The implementation of an effective communication strategy may involve the development of an IT infrastructure that unifies the intelligence agencies towards achieving the set goals and objectives that relate to the provision of crucial information regarding major security concerns. The IT infrastructure may create an effective platform for information sharing, which is an effective strategy that helps to deal with major security concerns.

The ability of the intelligence agencies to fill communication gaps helps to ensure that all work towards meeting the overall goal and objective. Another significant aspect of communication that enables the intelligence agencies to perform their roles effectively is the ability to have a collective plan and strategy to address any issue. In the process of gathering intelligence, planning is a vital aspect that helps to examine the progress of the exercise and to determine the effectiveness of the implemented measures (Walker, 2006, p.1140). Through proper planning, the agencies can gather information accurately without any suspicion. For example, the process of investigating an individual may require laying proper measures to ensure that all the relevant details are obtained. The implementation of proper planning strategies may require the agencies to capitalize on a technology that enhances their process and the establishment of an oversight team examines the plans.

When focusing on dealing with intelligence failure in a region, it is important to consider cooperation as it is a vital aspect that enables intelligence agencies to collect information effectively. Cooperation has a significant role in ensuring that intelligence agencies deal with issues that hinder effectiveness in the process of obtaining crucial security information (Johnson, 2005, p.116). The establishment of measures to capitalize on cooperation among the intelligence agencies may help towards dealing with the security issue that relates to multiple terror attacks. Through cooperation, intelligence agencies can identify their roles in promoting security by dealing with major concerns such as the ability to obtain crucial information concerning a security threat. On the other hand, it is necessary to note that a lack of proper cooperation measures among the intelligence agencies may create a loophole that threatens the security system of a region. Ultimately, the loophole created in the security system may expose a region to possible attacks that threaten the safety and security of people in society. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Between 2015 and 2018, intelligence bodies in the UK thwarted over a dozen serious terrorist plots. Agencies have to rely on a large pool of information to pinpoint locations and methods that are likely to be used by terrorists. Four distinct characteristics define the current terrorism threat faced by the UK are; (1) the use of violence, (2) political objectives, (3) sowing fear in a target population, and (4) gaining political mileage. Understanding the intelligence community in the United Kingdom is critical in assessing the shortcomings of intelligence gathering and failures. The departments that the agencies report to include the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Security Service (MI5), and Defence Intelligence (DI). Between 2005 and 2020, the UK experienced over 800 terrorism incidents with the standout being the London transport System bombings in 2005 and the Manchester Arena Bombings which had 57 and 42 fatalities respectively.

The greatest concern among stakeholders in the face of the current intelligence failures is whether agencies are changing and innovating enough to overcome the new security environment's obstacles. An Intelligence and Security Committee (2006) report into the 2005 London attacks provides valuable insights into the intelligence-gathering process and its impact on intelligence success or failure. Definitions of intelligence failure again emerged in the debate on if British intelligence agencies could do more to pre-empt the London attacks. Discussions on intelligence failure also focus on the role of radicalization within the country’s borders. As the study of intelligence grows apace, understanding what constitutes “Intelligence Studies” is imperative in developing a coherent approach to the topic of intelligence failure. An in-depth evaluation of the different sources highlights that intelligence failure is one of the most significant problems that the UK faces today as it combats terrorism. Despite the government’s efforts to invest in intelligence, one of the greatest issues that it is facing as it seeks to revamp its intelligence community is a clear disconnect between the different agencies mandated with intelligence collection.

Limitations

The study on intelligence failure in the United Kingdom faced different limitations that impacted on the findings obtained. Although the research focused on engaging in an extensive analysis of the factors that impact the intelligence, the study limitations influence the interpretation and presentation of the findings. The first limitation of the study involved limited access to the required information. Considering the nature of the issue addressed within the study, the researcher required in-depth information that would help to make the desired conclusions for the study. Addressing the issue of intelligence failure and determine whether the terrorist attacks experienced in UK results from the failure is an issue that required the researcher to obtain critical information from the relevant stakeholders. The study required information from the intelligence and security committees. However, the committees provided limited information, which influenced the interpretation and reliability of information considering that the researcher focused on secondary sources to provide more data regarding the study.

The second major limitation experienced involved in the technique used by the researcher to collect information regarding intelligence failure. The study capitalized on the use of newspaper reports on terrorist attacks and reports from the intelligence and security committees as the primary sources. The use of the given research tools limited the research conducted, considering that the researcher relied on the information provided by the authors of the reports. Although the reports obtained were from reliable sources, it is important to note that the information was based on other studies, meaning that they may include some limitations. Additionally, the fact that the study focused on a sensitive issue that concerns the security of the UK, obtaining first-hand information regarding the intelligence failure may provide an effective platform to make proper interpretations of the findings. The limitation impacted on the ability of the researcher to engage in a thorough investigation of the issue. 

Another major limitation noted in the study is time constrains, which is an aspect that hindered the ability of the researcher to seek more information from different sources. The deadlines to finish up on the study created a major challenge for the researcher, which impacted on the process of reviewing different methodologies that would be appropriate to provide crucial information regarding intelligence failure. The issues of time resulted in a situation where the researcher focused on the use of a research methodology that would only provide basic information without focusing on the underlining factors that impact the level of terrorism in the UK. Additionally, the limitation affected the ability of the researcher to select a sample population that would provide information concerning the issue of intelligence failure as a contributing factor to terrorism.

The third limitation involved the sensitive nature of the information required in the research created a major challenge for the researcher. When dealing with matters concerning national security, obtaining resources and information becomes a major problem that affects the quality of the research. In this case, the study did not experience much support from different people considering that it focused on addressing failures in the security systems that contribute to terrorism attacks in the UK. The limitation made the researcher focus more on information from previous research considering the challenges of obtaining information from government and security agencies. Lastly, the researcher overemphasized on the issue of the intelligence failure concerning terrorism attacks without focusing much on factors that contribute to the failure. Lack of a broader approach created a major limitation of the study considering that the study focused on the aspect of the failure of the intelligence and left out other key aspects such as the organizational and interpersonal issues that resulted in intelligence failure.

Recommendations

Considering that intelligence is an important aspect that helps to deal with security issues, it is important to focus on the implementation of effective measures to overcome intelligence failure. The first major recommendation that would be relevant in dealing with failure in intelligence is communication improvement. Poor communication among the intelligence agencies is the underlying factor that contributes to failure and lack of effectiveness in the process of obtaining the required and appropriate intelligence on a given issue (Goodman, 2008, p. 67). In that case, the implementation of effective communication strategies may enable the agencies to share crucial information. The intelligence agencies handling a security concern requires to have constant communication that enhances the accomplishment of a mission. Through effective communication, the agencies may identify issues and key aspects that hinder their ability to obtain information regarding a security concern such as a terror attack.

Additionally, it is necessary to focus on defining the communication avenues that should be used to relay information between the agencies. When dealing with matters concerning security and the safety of people in a society, it is necessary to focus on ensuring that proper intelligence is obtained and delivered to the relevant authorities for immediate action (Donohue, 2008, p.303). In that case, investing in an effective communication channel is key as it helps to ensure that the intelligence is delivered to the authorities effectively. Inefficient communication channels have a role in intelligence failure as they may cause delay and distortion of the intelligence, thus resulting in a terrorist attack. Another key element of consideration regarding the communication of intelligence agencies entails promoting coordination and cooperation of the agencies. For example, when dealing with a security concern as the main target of the agencies, it is necessary to cooperate and coordinate towards obtaining information regarding a security issue. 

The second recommendation for dealing with intelligence failure in the UK involves focusing on increasing resources on the agencies. The availability of the required resources in the intelligence agencies helps to achieve the set goals and objectives relating to obtaining information that concerns the security and safety of peoples in a given region. Firstly, it is important to invest in human resources, as it helps to ensure that the intelligence agencies have adequate personnel to collect a different kind of intelligence. Lack of adequate human resources in intelligence agencies is a key factor that contributes to an intelligence failure, thus resulting in a significant increase in security concerns (Richards, 2018, p.401). Investing in adequate human resources would mean that intelligence agencies have the personnel to handle a wide range of issues. Ultimately, this helps to create an effective environment for dealing with security concerns considering that there is adequate intelligence. 

Lastly, dealing with intelligence failure may require the implementation of advanced technology. The recommendation for using advanced technology ensures that intelligence agencies deal with a complex situation. The use of traditional methods of surveillance has a major role in intelligence failure, thus resulting in a significant increase in security concerns. The intelligence agencies should devise strategies and approaches that seek to collect intelligence even in complex situations. The implementation of advanced technology in intelligence agencies would mean that even the slightest information regarding a security concern is obtained to enable the security committees to devise appropriate measures (Bosilca, 2013, p.13). The agencies should focus on establishing appropriate technologies that would be fit for different situations concerning the collection of intelligence. It is necessary to focus on an advancement that would be efficient and reliable considering that intelligence is a crucial aspect of national security. Proper use of advanced technology would mean that the intelligence agencies would be in a position to identify security targets and interact with people without raising any suspicion.

Suggestions for Future Research

The implementation of effective research strategies and approaches have a significant role in ensuring that the information obtained is reliable and appropriate for the study. To improve future research, it is important to analyse the limitations noted in the current research and devise measures to make improvements. The first key aspect that may be used to enhance future research entails focusing on an effective research technique. Before engaging in a study, it is necessary to examine the most appropriate technique, approach, and research tools that may be relevant in providing the required information. In this case, the analysis of the appropriate method should base on the research objectives and the research question developed for the study. A researcher should capitalize on the selection of a study approach that provides thorough information regarding the study topic. An effective study method may help in defining the nature of resources and materials required to complete the research effectively. 

The second important aspect that is necessary to consider in future research entails focusing on allocating adequate time for the study. Time is an important aspect of research as it helps to ensure that all the relevant aspects are considered to obtain reliable and comprehensive information. The analysis of the time factor in a study requires the analysis of key aspects such as the method that should be used and the resources required to complete the study. In future research, it is necessary to capitalize on time flexibility, which is a key aspect that helps to ensure that a researcher engages in an effective and thorough study to obtain all the required facts. Additionally, it is important to focus on the implementation of a study method that is not limiting to capitalize on obtaining information that is relevant and accurate.

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