US Foreign Policy with North Korea

Introduction 

In the post-Cold War period, North Korea has been among the most persistent and vexing problems in U.S. foreign policy. There has never been any formal diplomatic relations between the United States with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The past three U.S. administrations have been occupied by negotiations over the nuclear weapons program of North Korea. North Korea has been a beneficiary of U.S. aid amounting to over $1 billion. Also, the country has become a target of dozens of U.S. sanctions. This paper provides background information on the nuclear weapons program of North Korea negotiations which began in the early 1990s under the Clinton Administration. The negotiations moved from mostly bilateral to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States) as U.S. policy toward Pyongyang evolved through the presidencies of George W. Bush and Obama. Major problems have persisted with the implementation of some key agreements reached through negotiations that layout deals for recognition and aid to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization. The Six-Party Talks were suspended since 2009 which has increased the concern of other actors about proliferation. Recent events such as the death of Kim Jong-il's in December 2011 has led to Kim Jong-un consolidate his authority as North Koreas supreme leader. The launching of a rocket in April 2012, December 2012 and February 2013 by the new supreme leader led to falling apart of the previous bilateral agreements with the United States. North Korea has since taken a number of provocative steps in response to new U.N. sanctions. This poses a question whether North Korea has the capacity to hurt the interests of the U.S. interests including a strike on the United States itself. Although the U.S. policy toward North Korea is on the nuclear weapons program, there are other issues of basic interest to the U.S. They include North Koreas missile programs, violent provocations upon South Korea, illicit activities, and poor human rights record. 

Background: History of Nuclear Negotiations 

For nearly three decades, North Korea's nuclear weapons programs have been a matter of concern for the United States. The U.S. intelligence in the 1980s detected a new construction of a nuclear reactor situated at Yongbyon. North Korea agreed to IAEA inspections in the early 1990s. However, they obstructed IAEA inspections which led to the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This led to a serious crisis as a pre-emptive military strike on the North Koreas nuclear facilities was seriously considered by the Clinton administration (Stanton et al., 2017) . A diplomatic mission from former President Jimmy Carter and the discussion of sanctions at the United Nations Security Council diffused the tension. This eventually led to the 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea on the provision of heavy fuel oil and two light water reactors to North Korea in exchange for freezing of its plutonium program (Rinehart et al., 2016) . The agreement also documented the path toward the resumption of normal diplomatic relations. The agreement faced multiple problems from the start through a lack of compliance by the North Koreans and funding delays from the U.S. side. However, the fundamentals of the agreement were implemented. In 2002, the agreement was dealt a blow after North Korea was confronted about a suspected uranium enrichment program by U.S. officials. These new concerns led to the suspension of the project in 2003, the expulsion of inspectors from the Yongbyon site and the withdrawal of North Korea from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In January 2006, the agreement and the project were officially terminated. 

Six-Party Talks 

The negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue under the George W. Bush Administration expanded to include Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia (Nikitin et al., 2017) . The six rounds of the talks from 2003-2007 were not successful. The talks yielded little incremental progress but failed to resolve the fundamental issue about the North Korean nuclear arms. The breakthrough that was most promising occurred in 2005. A Joint Statement was issued where North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. In return, North Korea would be guaranteed of U.S aid, security, and normalization of U.S relations (Nikitin et al., 2017) . However, the joint statement promise was broke down due to complications over the release of North Korean assets from a Macau bank. The process degenerated further in October 2006 as North Korea tested a nuclear device. 

In February 2007, Six-Party Talks negotiators announced an agreement that would provide economic and diplomatic benefits to North Korea (Snyder, 2016) . This would be done in exchange for disablement and freeze of the nuclear facilities of Pyongyang. An October 2007 agreement followed that laid out more specifically the implementation plans. This included a North Korean declaration of its nuclear programs, the disablement of the Yongbyon facility, and the lifting of economic sanctions on North Korea (Snyder, 2016) . Also, North Korea would be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. These deal agreements were pushed by the Bush Administration. However, the agreement stalled because of disagreements over the verification protocol between Pyongyang and Washington in November 2008 (Snyder, 2016) . 

North Korea’s Missile Programs 

North Korea twice launched long-range rockets twice despite international condemnation and UNSCR prohibitions. This demonstrated the importance that North Korea places on the development of ballistic missiles. A 2013 U.S. government report said that North Korea has deployed small numbers of ballistic missiles that could reach the U.S. and Japan and bases (Pollack, 2017) . However, these missiles have never been tested by flight. North Korea made slow progress in the development of a reliable long-range ballistic missile. North Korea became successful in December 2012 by launching the first successful space launch after having failed four consecutive times in 1998, 2006, 2009, and 2012. In 2006, North Korea was barred from conducting missile-related activities from the UNSC Resolution. North Korea disobeyed this resolution with a test launch conducted in April 2009. The DPRK ballistic missile program was given more restrictions as the UNSC responded with Resolution 1874. North Korea claimed that the Leap Day Agreement of 2012 included a ballistic missile moratorium on tests that excluded satellite launches. North Korea was inconsistent in its progress toward developing a long-range missile. The U.S. National Intelligence Estimated that North Korea was capable of successfully testing an inter-continental ballistic missile by 2015. A 2011 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that North Korean was capable of developing a nuclear program. Other people have argued that North Korea would take a radical but different approach by conducting one successful test and declaring operational capability. 

The potential ability of North Korea to develop a nuclear warhead is a major concern of the United States. However, experts at the Institute for Science and International Security have demonstrated that North Korea has the capability to a short based nuclear warhead. It was widely said in 2012 by top North had developed a long-range missile that was able to hit the United States with a nuclear weapon. However, there was no clear evidence that North Korea had developed a warhead that was capable of long-range strikes. 

Foreign Connections 

The proliferation of missile expertise and technology by North Korea is another serious concern for the United States. North Korea has sold missile technology to several countries, including Libya, Egypt, Iran, Myanmar, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Yemen. Sales of telemetric and missiles information from missile tests have provided hard currency for the Kim regime. Iran and North Korea since the 1980s have cooperated on the technical aspects of missile development by exchanging components and information. It was reported that Iran’s ballistic missile scientific advisors from research centers were observed in North Korea. It was also reported that China may be assisting the missile program of North Korea. This was either through tacit approval or whether directly from trade in sensitive materials. a U.N. investigation of sanctions violations was conducted after it was reported that heavy transport vehicles from the Chinese were sold to North Korea. These vehicles were later used in a military parade to showcase missiles by North Korea in April 2012. The U.S. National Intelligence Estimated that North Korea was capable of successfully testing an inter-continental ballistic missile by 2015. A 2011 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that North Korean was capable of developing a nuclear program. Other people have argued that North Korea would take a radical but different approach by conducting one successful test and declaring operational capability. 

U.S.-DPRK Relations in 2018 

Advances in North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs 

The rapid advances of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in 2016 and 2017 have shifted the assessment of North Korea’s threat to the United States by U.S. policymakers (Payne, 2017) . North Korea has for a long time presented security challenges to U.S. interests. However, recent tests have shown that North Korea is not capable of striking the United States with a ballistic missile that is nuclear-armed. The increase in missile capability has made North Korea a top-line U.S. national security and foreign policy problem. It has outpaced terrorism and the Middle East in the first 18 months of the Trump Administration (Payne, 2017) . North Korea’s threats have increased across long-range missile technology, nuclear weapons, short-range artillery, submarine-based missiles, and cyber attack capacity. Three nuclear tests were conducted between January 2016 and September 2017 by North Korea. In addition, North Korea conducted missiles with multiple tests in 2017 (Payne, 2017) . According to security experts, these missiles had the capability of reaching the continental United States. Satellite imagery has also shown that North Korea appeared to be developing a ballistic missile program using submarine technology that could potentially help in evading the missile defense programs of the U.S. The Trump Administration, in December 2017, blamed North Korea for the cyber attacks which crippled computer networks worldwide (Payne, 2017) . This demonstrated the ability of North Korea to disrupt critical operations by using cyber attacks. 

Trump Administration Policy 2017: Hostile Rhetoric and Maximum Pressure 

The Trump Administration initially responded by instituting a maximum pressure policy that sought to force North Korea to change its behavior through diplomatic and economic measures. Many of President Trump policy elements were similar to those used by the Obama administration. This was through putting more economic pressure against North Korea and attempting to persuade China and other countries to apply more pressure against North Korea. The policy also sought to expand the capabilities of the U.S., South Koreans and Japan alliances to counter the new North Korean threats. Trump administration influenced the United Nations Security Council successfully to pass four new sanctions resolutions. This expanded the U.N. member states requirements to curtail their diplomatic, military, and economic interaction with North Korea. Both Trump and Obama administrations pushed countries in the world to eliminate their ties to North Korea. The elimination of ties was significant in ways that were beyond the UNSC sanctions and requirements. The Trump administration, in a departure from previous administrations, considered the option of launching a military strike against North Korea. During the course of Trump's presidency up to now, Trump and senior administration members have issued contradictory statements on North Korea. This was on questions regarding U.S. negotiation conditions and whether the United States was prepared to strike as a preventive measure against North Korea. The differences in the public statements of the administration have created confusion about U.S. policy at times. 

Shift to Diplomacy in Early 2018 

North Korea, in early 2018, accepted an invitation from South Korea President Moon Jae-in to attend the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea. This followed months of diplomacy and outreach by South Korean officials hoping to lower tensions. President Trump shortly afterward accepted an invitation to meet with Kim that was delivered by North Korea officials. North Korea president met twice with Chinese President Xi Jinping and twice with Moon before the 2018 Singapore Summit between Trump and Kim (Moon, 2019) . This set the stage for the awaited meeting between the heads of state of the U.S. and North Korea. Varied opinions were given on why Kim launched a charm offensive after making various provoking attempts in the previous years. Experts argued that it was a combination of various factors that drove North Korea president to pursue diplomacy (Moon, 2019) . These factors included the harsh rhetoric of North Korea of a possible military confrontation with the Trump administration. The second reason was the increase in harsh sanctions that limited the ability of North Korea to grow its economy. Also, the aggressive outreach of Moon Jae-in to North Korea during the 2018 Winter Olympics led to the change in rhetoric. Finally, North Korea's president had confidence that he had additional leverage after securing a limited nuclear deterrent against the United States (Moon, 2019) . 

The June 2018 Trump-Kim Singapore Summit 

President Trump and Kim on June 12, 2018, met in Singapore to discuss the nuclear program of North Korea. The meeting was to build a peace North Korea regime and improve the future of U.S. relations with North Korea. Trump and Kim, following the summit, issued a brief joint statement. Trump committed his administration’s efforts to provide security guarantees to North Korea. Kim reaffirmed his unwavering and firm commitment to complete the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Singapore document which is shorter on details than previous nuclear agreements acted on a statement of principles in four areas including normalization, peace, provide remains of fighters of Korean war and denuclearization (Moon, 2019) . The agreement did not mention of the ballistic missile program of North Korea. The two sides agreed to conduct follow-up negotiations. Trump, in the press conference following the summit, announced that the United States would suspend the U.S.-South Korea military exercises that were performed annually. Also, Trump expressed hope of withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops that were stationed in South Korea eventually. The U.S Defence Department announced that the annual U.S.-South Korea would be cancelled the week after the summit (Moon, 2019) . 

Many analysts observed the stated agreements covered areas that had been included in previous North Korea agreements even though the agreements were not made North Korea leader. The agreement supporters point out that the suspension nuclear and missile tests would reduce the ability of North Korea to advance its capability further (Ko, 2019) . The critics of the agreement point the lack of any reference or a timeframe for the denuclearization process. They also point at the lack of commitment by Kim to dismantle the ballistic missile program of North Korea. However, the definition of denuclearization, sequencing of the denuclearization process including the establishment of a peace regime were left uncertain. Although international sanctions and the U.S. remain in place it is challenging to fully implement existing sanctions amidst the engagement initiative (Moon, 2019) . 

Conclusion 

In the post-Cold War period, North Korea has been among the most persistent and vexing problems in U.S. foreign policy. There have never been any formal diplomatic relations between the United States with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The past three U.S. administrations have been occupied by negotiations over the nuclear weapons program of North Korea. North Korea has been a beneficiary of U.S. aid amounting to over $1 billion. Also, the country has become a target of dozens of U.S. sanctions. This paper has provided background information on the nuclear weapons program of North Korea negotiations which began in the early 1990s under the Clinton Administration. The negotiations moved from mostly bilateral to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States) as U.S. policy toward Pyongyang evolved through the presidencies of George W. Bush and Obama. Major problems have persisted with the implementation of some key agreements reached through negotiations that layout deals for recognition and aid to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization. The Six-Party Talks were suspended since 2009 which has increased the concern of other actors about proliferation. Recent events such as the death of Kim Jong-il's in December 2011 has led to Kim Jong-un consolidate his authority as North Koreas supreme leader. The launching of a rocket in April 2012, December 2012 and February 2013 by the new supreme leader led to falling apart of the previous bilateral agreements with the United States. North Korea has since taken a number of provocative steps in response to new U.N. sanctions. 

References 

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