1) Issue for Decision and Recommended Course of Action
On September 5th 1995, CNN correspondent in Sarajevo, Christiane Amanpour reported “NATO warplanes blasted Bosnian Serb targets close to Sarajevo on Tuesday, sending huge clouds of smoke into the sky and abruptly ending a four-day period of grace marked by Serb stalling.” 1 The attack marked the beginning of ‘Operation Deliberate Force’ a persistent air campaign by NATO in conjunction with the ground-based United Nations’ Protection Force, whose objective was to incapacitate the Bosnian Serb Army that threatened and attacked areas designated as ‘safe’ by the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina leading to massacres in Srebrenica and Markale that prompted external intervention. The operation led by the allied forces from 15 nations lasted for 30 days and involved 400 aircraft and 5,000 personnel. Over 1,026 bombs, majority of which were precision guided were dropped obliterating most of the 338 Bosnian Serb targets. 2 The intervention by NATO led allied forces was critical in ending the three year-long Bosnian War that continues to be described as an international armed conflict.
The decision to bomb Bosnian Serbs was an outcome of a number of implications. First, the Bosnian Serbs failed to heed the NATO-UN warning to withdraw the threat of its artillery from the 20-kilometer zone around Sarajevo. Second, the sustained air strikes were informed by the insignificant pace with which the Bosnian Serbs moved their artillery, which was interpreted as failure to comply by the allied forces. The developments followed in the wake of repeated warnings about serious reprisals from the UN if its demands were not met by the rebels. NATO and the UN communicated directly to the Serbs, to elicit their compliance and cease attacks on Sarajevo, the UN-designated safe place, a move intended to ensure freedom of movement of UN forces and personnel, non-governmental organizations, and provision of unrestricted use of the airport at Sarajevo. The immediate reprisals followed the expiry of the NATO deadline. It is imperative to recognize that NATO intervention came amidst what was perceived as the UN ‘going soft’, thus threatening the success of the attack. NATO secretariat was responsible for the eventual decision to turn the UN resolve around and open an avenue for NATO bombing.
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2) Analysis
The bombing of the Bosnian Serbs was in the offing for years following consistent pressure on NATO allies by the US. In 1993, Whitney reporting for the New York Times observed that the decision was to be taken upon request by the UN. In all countries where civil war threatens to cause immense damage, the UN is mandated to keep peace and protect civilians from potential harm from either side of the warring factions. When the UN feels that peace and safety of civilians is threatened is has the right to call for external assistance. It is important to examine events that motivated the UN into such a decision through the lens of the Bosnian War.
Failure of the rebels to comply with the UN directive to withdraw their artillery from the Bosnian capital and its environs prompted recommendations for further assistance. According to Whitney (1993), 16 delegations met to overcome resistance from Canada and Britain, and the outcome was commencement of immediate military preparations for stronger measures in collaboration with the UN. Prior to intervention in Bosnia, the US and the West in general have been recipients of mixed reactions due to failure to lead from the front in ending violence and conflict. Daalder (1998) posited that decisions to intervene are often intended to end ethnic cleansing, massacres of hundreds of thousands of civilians, and concentration camps. In the context of these motivations, Holbrooke (1999) examined the US decision to take a leadership role in ending the Bosnian War by accounting for the turnaround in its foreign policy.
According to Hildebrandt, Hildebrandt, Holm et al. (2013) humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect stems from the collective action of motivating says to participate in a multilateral coalition to stop atrocity. The decision to intervene is informed by a domestic consensus by states who view it as their democratic right and responsibility. 3 It is understandable that noncompliance by the Serbians left NATO with a limited choice. However, the decision to invade was welcomed by the Bosnian administration at the time. The Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, tirelessly pleaded with the western leaders to show their might against the Serbian rebels, to the extent that they hailed the bombing while asserting that the world did what was long overdue. 4 Though the Bosnian bombing drew criticism from leaders of the rebels who termed it a moral disaster for the Western world and the UN, 5 it is the political will of the Bosnian government which contributed towards the decision.
The US was behind the drive for NATO campaigns, a process resulting from relenting foreign policy stipulations. Daalder (1998) posited that President Clinton’s administration had exhausted and lost credibility of its day-to-day management of the Bosnian crisis, an amalgamation of events led to reconsideration of alternative to wade through. The decision was also encouraged at the policy level by the apparent willingness to divert from the past incremental practices by creating an integrated strategy for Bosnia. Efforts were made by those concerned to accelerate handling of the issues as humanitarian interventions have been established to influence policy in the US, especially during electioneering years. The outcome was the American Bosnian policy whose success was intertwined with the decision of the Serb rebels to end the war in 1995. 6 The Serb leadership, in early 1995, declared to end the war in its fourth year, a claim that was backed by significant attacks on civilian towns with majority populations of Muslims. The brazen strategy aimed to conducted a large scale attack on three Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. All of which were demarcated by the UN as safe places. Sarajevo was to be the grand prize capture. As the Serb pan unfolded, the UN and its forces were incapacitated by policy restrictions that would otherwise have meant sacrificing the evenhandedness hallmark of UN peace keeping. The soft stance by the UN allowed room for genocides, kidnappings, and other inhuman atrocities that prompted the UN to seek NATO’s help to defend the cities and civilians from the rebels.
The US wanted to get out of the box in addressing the situation as conventional policy informed approaches failed to yield desired outcomes. The US decision was based on failure of the diplomatic strategy offering concessions to the Bosnian president with the hope of getting the Serbs to the table; refusal to put US troops on the ground; resistance by the allies to use force; insistence of the UN on traditional peacekeeping principles; and the Congress assumption moral high ground in lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia without taking responsibility for the same 7 . It is apparent that the decision was a culmination of events from both internal and external proceedings.
3) Strategies for Overcoming Problems
As evidenced through the US turnaround to be a forefront leader in humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, one can argue that crafting of foreign policy is driven by ideas and bureaucratic politics. 8 Similar sentiments are echoed in Hildebrandt, Hillebrecht, Holm et al. (2013) where emphasis is placed on the role of Congressional leanings in teams of ideology and political parties in the support of humanitarian intervention. It is apparent that the Bosnian government was brought to its knees by the rebels; hence the insistent calls for external military aid. On this account one can argue that the state in need of humanitarian intervention places its future on the willingness and success of allied forces and would accept any concessions placed upon it. Under the circumstances, the onus lies with the intervening parties not just to emerge victorious from the war, but also to lay the best foundation for recovery of the warring nation.
The paradigm shift in ideologies and policies governing the rules of engagement in humanitarian intervention are encapsulated in the arguments advanced in Garten (2003). According to Garten, a shift in discourse on such policies should emphasize on establishment of a major initiative with skilled personnel, funds, and permanency to handle the aftermath effects of the US military interventions in foreign countries. The process should begin through justification of the cause of deployment of American troops for humanitarian intervention in the context of peacekeeping mission. The next step should be to address the ad hoc, underfunded, and understaffed post war victory efforts to aid recuperation of the affected nation. Nevertheless, the role of nonmilitary engagement through highly skilled and dedicated expert to handle chaotic political situation is necessary to limit the effects of military intervention. Policy on recovery in the aftermath of victory should target the government of the recipient country to assist in laying frameworks for the same.
References
Amanpour, C. (1995, Sep). NATO hammers Bosnian Serbs with new strikes. CNN. Retrieved on 26/7/2017 from: http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/sep95/9-05/am/index.html.
Daalder, I. H. (1998, Dec). Decision to intervene: How the war in Bosnia ended. Brookings. Retrieved on 26/7/2017 from: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/.
Drezner, D. W. (2000). Ideas, bureaucratic politics, and the crafting of foreign policy. American Journal of Political Science , 733-749.
Garten, J. E. (2003). Memo to the President: The US Needs to Create a Colonial Service. Foreign Policy , 63-67.
Hildebrandt, T., Hillebrecht, C., Holm, P. M., & Pevehouse, J. (2013). The domestic politics of humanitarian intervention: Public opinion, partisanship, and ideology. Foreign Policy Analysis , 9 (3), 243-266.
Holbrooke, R. (1999). To End a War . New York: Modern Library. p. 327. ISBN 0-375-75360-5.
Whitney, C. R. (1993, Aug). Conflict in the Balkans; NATO to join U.S. in planning air strikes against Serbs' Forces. The New York Times. Retrieved on 26/7/2017 from: http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/03/world/conflict-balkans-nato-join-us-planning-air-strikes-against-serbs-forces.html.
Williams, D. (1995, Aug). NATO continues extensive bombing across Bosnia. Washington Post. P. A01.
1 Amanpour, C. the CNN correspondent in Sarajevo reported of the unfolding events in the confrontation between NATO allied forces and the Serbs as residents watched from the streets of the city with binoculars.
2 Holbrooke, R. (1999). To End a War. p. 137 offers logistics description of the war.
3 Hildebrandt, Hildebrandt, Holm et al. (2013) emphasize on the role of political will and public opinion in such decisions, especially in the context of the US where Congressional approval is necessary.
4 Williams, D. (1995, Aug). NATO continues extensive bombing across Bosnia. Washington Post. P. A01.
5 Ibid
6 Daalder, I. H. (1998, Dec). Decision to intervene: How the war in Bosnia ended. Brookings. An explanation is issued of the transformation of American policy on humanitarian intervention exclusively to end the Bosnian War and inform future decision making.
7 Ibid.
8 Drezner, D. W. (2000). Ideas, bureaucratic politics, and the crafting of foreign policy. American Journal of Political Science , 733.
