Federalism and the Response to Pandemic: Austria

In terms federalism rights and territories, the national and regional administrations are autonomous. This liberty suggests that they are equally autonomous in their existence and free of each other's control. In this context, autonomy refers to both legal and physical presence e.g., the existence of a legislative assembly, the court, state bureaucracy, executive branch of government. Federalism is associated with power sharing between two levels of government, the federal and state governments, rather than the interrelation between the national government and rational governments, or how geographical, political, and ethnic ethnicities share state power (Bussjäger & Johler, 2020). The strategies for dividing powers between the central government and regional governments should be predicted on an exclusive legislative list that specifies the central government's powers and a residual legislative list that defines the state regional governments' powers. 

Regional Governments exist on an Equal Terms 

Equality indicates that individual states should have equal authority; no municipality or region should less authority than the others, nor should they be given preferential treatment or attention from the national government (Kennedy, 2020). This is due to the fact that any regional authority with a predominance of authority may develop a superiority complex, resulting in a state of instability rather than the balance that the federal system aims to attain. 

Analysis of Different Federalism Perspectives 

Legal Perspective on Federalism 

The legal view is also known as the traditional definition of federalism, which is closely related with the United States federal system, which is regarded as the model of federalism. It also listed some established legal requisites, such as a bi-cameral legislative branch, ideally with two parties, an independent judiciary and supreme court system, a multi-party system, independent electoral processes, financial independence, a written constitution, independent electoral processes and a balance of powers.  This fundamental system of federalism has been criticized its inflexibility legalistic among other things.  

American federalism creates the impression that it is strong without any issues Another fundamental flaw in federalism categorization is the misunderstanding of organizational criteria as distinguishing qualities of federalism when they are not, since not every federal forms of government have these features. 

Federalism as a Process 

Federalism is a technique for articulating and protecting society's federal traits. This perspective is also referred to as "sociological federalism."   Similarly, major scholars in the federalization process identify it as a  A process in which factors of unity and discord are constantly pushed and pulled. As a result, any trend of federal state constitutional structure based on this perspective provides an idea of a constantly dynamic process. Despite the variances in how the federal notion is conceptualized, it is evident that federalism is a political system that promotes unity in variety, power distribution between tiers of government' 

Power Perspective 

Power is essential for resource sharing and also for understanding federalism as a paradigm for dealing with group relationships and interactions.  According to this viewpoint, federalism is an attempt to address the issue of power and authority in the process of political community unification. When states are grouped together to form a collectivity, the most fundamental challenge for the level of power the community possess, which is a primary predictor of resources that would be allocated.  This is to prevent a major faction or segments of society from seizing complete political control.  

Federalism's Nature 

Federalism in context is a governance system that may be appropriate in particular countries based on physical region, demography, and cultural traits, such as language, ethnicity and religion.  Federalism's proponents do not propose that it should be implemented universally.  The countries that practice federalism have a wide diversity of institutional arrangements. Some federal countries have specific Federal rights to intervene in areas that are typically the jurisdiction of constituent units, albeit these powers are rarely employed. Furthermore, some traditionally called unitary countries have a considerable level of regional decentralization 

Austrian Federal Administration 

In Austria, the separation of powers between the federal state and the constitution differentiates between direct and indirect governances.  The latter is compensated for its considerable lack of authority by a large share of the federal administration and control on behalf of the state. In actuality, indirect federal administration is not hierarchical, but rather a complicated negotiation mechanism that oversees federal law execution (Lehmbruch, 2019). Austria's distinctive indirect method of governance reflects a specific sort of "executive federalism." Regarding the control by national governments of direct governance, the Federal Constitution is ambiguous, such that "a major portion of the country government's activity remains unattended." 

Austrian Federal Health 

Health and social care in Austria are organized as distinct, fragmented systems, which show extensive tax and para-fiscal federalism. While a significant portion of the healthcare financing is dependent on social insurance payments, social services are not part of the Bismarckian heritage in the country and remains substantially tax-financed (Trukeschitz et al., 2014). As a result, healthcare and social services are distinguished by various levels federalism. Both the federal government and the provinces of the nation are responsible for health and social services. Autonomous social health insurance is a prominent aspect whose premiums are controlled by regional healthcare bodies. 

This multiplicity of systems and policies is noticeable because Austria has a very small population and size. The Country, though tiny, has 9 provinces. The key stakeholders at the federal level are the Ministry of Health (MOH) and Parliament. In revising the regulatory framework for health care, the MoH normally sends proposals for a new law to Parliament following consultations with all parties. The MoH does not, however, have direct authority over health care. While the provinces have substantial discretionary powers in the hospital care sector, self-government health insurance regulates finance and the provision of health care in ambulatory and rehabilitative care. However, regulation is quite precise in this latter area, which also includes the premium rates and requirements on contracting with health care providers, essentially limiting discretionary authority. 

The MoH is backed by numerous other organizations in its responsibilities. The Supreme Health Board made up of 39 members selected informs the minister on state-of-the-art medical and the healthcare. The Health Österreich Company (GÖG) includes three business units. It also develops the Austrian Structural Health Plan (ÖSG), which is a tool for capacity planning in healthcare (Trukeschitz et al., 2014).  The provinces of Austria enjoy autonomous political authority. The provinces have a health department that exercises its jurisdiction in the province as the highest health authority, that is central to public health interventions. Another obligation is the regulation of the labor market and training institutions for health practitioners. The provincial health board supports the department. Medical treatment is the most crucial political area. In each province, the local parliament establishes law on the structure of hospitals and finances according to the federal framework laws. The provinces have the authority to restrict access to the healthcare system as well as to administer many Austrian hospitals either explicitly or via corporations of public ownership. 

As part of the 1997 hospital funding reform, the hospital finance was "exchanged" for the consent of provinces to introduce a DRG-like refund system (Trukeschitz et al., 2014). Only with 2005 health reform that provincial health funding has been improved and redesignated as provincial health funds.  Their administrating organization is the Health Platform, consisting of the Province, the Austrian Cities Association, the Austrian Municipalities and Association.  Though the health platform constitution is dependent on provincial law, other parties can also participate. Most particularly, the Vienna health platform also includes political party members, while the registered nurse’s organization also exclusively includes other non-cadre representatives. 

The health platform should debate all health system-related issues in each region. The provinces in stark contradiction to this goal, automatically has vea majority of votes on hospital issues. Some issues relating both to hospital and to outpatient care must be resolved jointly both by MoH and the province, within which the reforms is essential. The Reform Pool seeks to enhance consolidation of healthcare at the intersection of hospital and out-patient care by funding related initiatives. However, due to defects in its incentive structure, it has not attained this objective. 

Austria’s Covid Response 

The first formal case of COVID 19 took place in Austria on 25 February.  The first Austrian was killed by COVID-19 on 12 March. At the same time, in an extreme after-ski festival, a ski resort called Ischgl, a virus pandemic exploded. This hotspot, along with Lombard media coverage of overwhelmed the healthcare facilities mortuaries leading to the shutting down of towns and prompting the government to react swiftly and radically (Kittel et al., 2020). On 13 March, all schools and stores apart from grocery shops and pharmacies were closed indefinitely by the Austrian administration countrywide. On 15 March, the Austrian Parliament created the legal basis for further actions, including a one-month residence-order. Austria's outperformed other nations, including the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Germany in the first wave, with just 85 deaths for every million population. By the end of the summer, Austria's rapid and subsequent measures had averted significant death rates and overwhelming of the health care system. However, the policies have caused significant economic and societal damage in general. 

Heavy organizational problems and higher expenditures confronted social and health services. The need for public services continued in several provinces or increased after COVID-19 pandemic. Certain vulnerable populations needed special assistance, while certain activities required full reform. Special shutdown targeted social enterprises in categories such as tourism, food and events (Krinner, 2020). The objective of this article is thus to discuss how the provinces were hit by the COVID-19 crisis, especially in the sector of health and social services, and how did the federal-provincial-government interplay evolve during the initial stages of the pandemic? 

Scholars have labelled as corporatists and welfare partners, nations with a substantial nonprofit sector and large amounts of social investment. The social democracy regime is marked by greater social expenditures, while non-profit groups have a lesser role to play in providing welfare. An additional partnership is one of intimate cooperation, in which both sides operate as collaborators. The federal government finances welfare services, although the provinces are able and capable of providing welfare services in various domains. In an additional partnership, the federal and provincial governments are working concurrently, filling a vacuum in the supply of state services. Finally, the federal government is trying to influence the public sector and the administration of provinces and states in an antagonistic relationship. 

The government-provincial relationship might be classified as a corporate partnership system in Austria. In corporatist welfare states, they traditionally play a major role in the delivery of public services. The Austrian provinces are therefore responsible for a large proportion of social services, and the public relations fit under the welfare partnership archetype (Schratz, 2016). The welfare policy and execution of federal, regional and municipal authorities are all engaged. The Austrian democracy is often characterized by a solid consensus, and a major role in the political process is the so-called "social partnership" between business representatives and labor unions (Meyer et al., 2021). They consider these modifications to be progressive rather than dramatic and reinforce the continuity as one of the core characteristics of Austrian social policy. These characteristics also reflect Austrian federalist quirks, particularly corporatism, and the tight links between provincial administration, political parties and religious organizations as defining aspects of governance. These provinces typically have connections to political parties or the Catholic or Evangelical Church. 

An examination of the economic crisis of 2008 provided an insight to how Austria responded with previous crises. Report shows that public financing for social assistance service providers has been reduced due to the crisis but that, at the time and throughout the following years, the provinces were affected differently. Organizations are often financed less not so much by means of direct cuts, but by lack of inflationary adjustments or by serving more customers with the same amount of financing. Annual social services growth rates decreased from over 6% in the pre-crisis years to 3% in the post-economic crisis years (Steurer & Clar, 2015). Lastly, the number of providers of these services also decreased, indicating a congestion of the market and a high unemployment. The drop-in growth rates in the sector following the crisis of 2008 can be explained by the reduction in the welfare state. 

The so-called European migration crisis of 2015, which has affected over one million immigrants, has also recently had significant ramifications for Austrian feudalism. The role of the provinces in funding was explored here, not so much in relation to their abilities to respond quickly to the situation. Provinces play the critical role in dealing with the flow of refugees and in their capacity to fill the federal government's gap. Certain provinces have organized themselves and have worked with significant volunteer contributions to offer new services without much governmental financing. 

The COVID-19 pandemic differed in terms of its financing impact from the economic crisis of 2008 and the 2015 migrant crisis. The financial crisis resulted in smaller income reductions, but instead a long-term growth in demand for social services without increasing the source of financing owing to austerity in public spending. However, in this situation, financing for the costs of these actions was also supplied by the Government. The COVID-19 disaster, by contrast, caused a reversal in revenue immediately. The primary danger to public health and the health system was, and still is, a concern and it has led to rigorous regulations to restrict viral transmission, resulting in tremendous economic harm and social collateral harm. 

COVID-19 also brought various problems to the provinces in terms of merging and going farther than the shortage of financing or the need to increase services in two of these crises: They have played a major role in combatting the epidemic as suppliers of services in the health care system. They have to safeguard vulnerable groups and personnel as care providers and social workers. As such, many provinces are expected to continue to face increasing numbers of new issues. Additionally, the pandemic has disrupted the administration of the provinces, which reduces service delivery and disrupts business activities by imposing further pandemic measures limits. 

List of References 

Bussjäger, P., & Johler, M. M. (2020). Power-Sharing in Austria: Consociationalism, Corporatism, and Federalism. Power-Sharing in Europe , 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53590-2_3 

Kennedy, J. (2020). Diverse Democracies and the Practice of Federalism. Federalism and National Diversity in the 21st Century , 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38419-7_2 

Kittel, B., Kritzinger, S., Boomgaarden, H., Prainsack, B., Eberl, J.-M., Kalleitner, F., Lebernegg, N. S., Partheymüller, J., Plescia, C., Schiestl, D. W., & Schlogl, L. (2020). The Austrian Corona Panel Project: monitoring individual and societal dynamics amidst the COVID-19 crisis. European Political Science , 20 (2), 318–344. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-020-00294-7 

Krinner, N. (2020). Coronavirus Measures in Austria: Hotels and Restaurants. https://www.austria.info/en/service-and-facts/coronavirus-information/hotels-restaurants. 

Lehmbruch, G. (2019). Sub-Federal State-Building and the Origins of Federalism: A Comparison of Austria, Germany and Switzerland. Configurations, Dynamics and Mechanisms of Multilevel Governance , 369–385. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05511-0_20 

Meyer, M., Millner, R., Pennerstorfer, A., & Vandor, P. (2021). Partnership in Times of COVID-19: Government and Civil Society in Austria. Nonprofit Policy Forum , 12 (1), 65–92. https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2020-0052 

Müller, M. (2020). The start of the Austrian response to the COVID-19 crisis: a personal account. Wiener Klinische Wochenschrift , 132 (13-14), 353–355. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00508-020-01693-y 

Schratz, M. (2016). Austria’s Balancing Act: Walking the Tightrope between Federalism and Centralization. Educational Policy in an International Context , 95–104. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137046758_7 

Steurer, R., & Clar, C. (2015). Is decentralisation always good for climate change mitigation? How federalism has complicated the greening of building policies in Austria. Policy Sciences , 48 (1), 85–107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-014-9206-5 

Trukeschitz, B., Schneider, U., & Czypionka, T. (2014). Federalism in Health and Social Care in Austria. Federalism and Decentralization in European Health and Social Care , 154–189. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137291875_8