Personal identity arises in individuals by the virtue of being humans. The self facet of individuals is always incorporated in the questions that surround existence. It involves some sort of immaterial features like the subject of consciousness. The need to define who they are, what makes them the person they are, what makes them exist predominantly, how do they find out who they are and whether they are undergoing any conscious change. Few concepts have acted as sources of misunderstanding and more inquiries about individual identity over time. There are three features about personal identity that tend to circulate within the psychological and philosophical views on personal identity; psychological- continuity views, brute- physical views and anticriterialism. Personal identity theory is the philosophical confrontation about the general views of our own existence. By focusing on two philosophers (John Locke and Derek Parfit) views on personal identity, distinct deductions can be made.
John Locke views on personal identity revolve around the aspect of psychological continuity. In this view, he is of the opinion that there is usually an evolution of an individual over time within their existence in order to fit in the new set of conditions. For example, in order for person X to survive a particular adventure, it should be necessary and sufficient that a person Y evolves psychologically from the original existence of person X that would help them conquer through the adventure. There is a significant psychological connection between beliefs, intentions, desires, and character traits, experiential memories that are usually casual and cognitive. He argues that at birth, the mind is usually an empty slate and that knowledge is determined by the experiments we siphon from sense perception. It focuses on the method of introspection, observation of personal emotions and the behaviors of one self. He argues that one’s identity exists as far as their consciousness, which can be equated with memory. “Consciousness always accompanies thinking” (Locke). If one cannot explain the experiment, one wasn’t really part of the experiment.
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Derek Parfit on the other hand bases his arguments on identity and survival. He is of the opinion that if X is to survive through the future, the survival will take place with or without anyone like X existing. However, he included conditions that would be fulfilled for the surviving to be a success. These conditions include character and apparent memories. He argues that important decisions can be made without the use of notion of the identity as argued before by previous philosophers. Parfit explains that, once a brain is transplanted into another person, the initial person still leaves through the new person and would survive. In the cases of two people, the initial person exists in two people. He redefines memory and other psychological relationships such as one doesn’t have to be the same person to experience an original experience remembered. For example, some characters of parents can be identified in the children. These similar characters lower as the generations increase. The difference between survival and identity remains as his point of focus.
Locke suggests that a self is a free agent capable of thinking intelligently, has reasons and reflection and has the ability to consider itself an itself. It considers the self an existing rational being and as long as one is the same self, the same rational being will have the same identity. It assumes that a consciousness can be extended backwards to any past actions or thoughts to the extend where it gets to the identity of the individual, the same self will be reflected currently and possesses the same experiences witness by the early self then. “As far as consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now as it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done” (Locke). Memory becomes a fundamental source of Locke’s theory and the bits of remembering or forgetting experiences raises doubts of which we are the same previous individuals. There are many opposing reasons to these claims laid down by early philosophers like Reid and Parfit. Parfit illustrates the interconnection between identity and survival. He redefined memory and other psychological relationships and opposed Locke’s theory of an individual remembering an occurrence because they happened to be that person. He explains that one needs a certain degree of character and apparent memories to be classified as surviving.
The two theories differ on a number of grounds. For example, Lockean theory is based on psychological continuation while Parfit’s theory is based on identity and survival. While Locke argues that one’s X is transplanted to Y, Y becomes X, parfit argues that when X is transplanted to Y, X survives through Y but Y retains their identity and they do not become identical. Critics argue that parfit’s theory on personal identity is based on judging of survival without the connectedness of psychological states which leaves room for explanation. One of these unanswered questions is the clarification on the degree up to which the survival of a self can be guaranteed in relations to their psychological connectedness. For example, in the case of a transplant or brain damage, one is made to believe experiences that happened even in cases where they did not take place, such as during amnesia. This elucidates that it is possible to remember experiences that actually happened to another person. Parfit’s theory however leads to the unintuitive result that this individual would be surviving as the initial individual unto whom the experiences had taken place to. It also supports the fact that the body of the individual is still alive and thus he is surviving but the existing personal identity belongs to another person.
In the case of Locke’s theory, both contemporary and modern philosophers have scrutinized, debated and even rejected it. Critics such as John Perry and Thomas Reid offer clear illustrations as to why the theory cannot be supported. “Sufficient condition implied is plausible: if I really can remember going to the store yesterday, then I must have gone to the store” (Perry). However, Perry’s critics have also been brushed off by memory theorists who argue that there is a possibility that the self who experienced the thing is different from the current self who has no memories of experiencing the thing. They are of the opinion that one’s self is composed of a series of some temporary states belonging to the same person. These temporary states of each self contain elements that might be a remembered experience or impression that preceding in time but still belong to the same person and in such the manifestation differs. “Composed of all the experiences any one person is having at a given time” (Grice). This was to clear the issue on transitivity raised from Reid’s contradiction to Locke’s theory. However, these memory theorists conclude that even though memory is both a sufficient and necessary condition in the issue of personal identity, some stipulations to account for its transitive nature should be amended.
Even though Grice reasons are sound, they fail to instill adequate definition to self and the aspect of personal identity. Parfit offered his own criticism on Locke’s theory citing fission cases as the main problem. In cases of transplanting X brain into Y and Z, Locke would argue that Y and Z both have the same quality of autobiographical memory of X. if the law of transitivity is to be used, and then Y and Z should be identical, which will be a false conclusion. According to Parfit’s arguments, neither Y nor Z is identical and that X identity has been lost. It’s either one of those halves is X or X simply stopped existing. In addition, X will either be manifested in Y or Z and it doesn’t make sense saying the two new individuals will both exist as X. The argument that Y and Z are both X will be a ridiculous consequence. However, by law of transitivity, the two are supposed to be identical to each other. In reality however, Y and Z are distinct beings. This goes against the law of transitivity which forms the basis of personal identity.
Memory theorist who supported Locke’s theory such as Grice failed to provide the aspect of identity as an independent substance. His response to the argument on transitivity is however adequate and acceptable. The interconnection between experiences and impression as elucidated in Locke’s theory makes it more relatable as an explanation of personal identity compared to Parfit’s. What makes a person’s action, experiences or psychological characteristics properly and wholly attributed to a person is the correctness of the incorporation into the self told story that makes up their life. Existence is therefore a subject of sequences of experiences that happen over time and not just artless or random unity. It makes sense to rationally anticipate some future experiences only if they will be the individual’s experiences. The only way they can be identified as the individuals is if they fit in the preferred criterion that describes the immediate happenings of the individual’s life accurately.
