One of the issues that stand out with regard to Republic of Azerbaijan is the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) issue in general and particularly the NK ethnic conflict that in 1991 to 1994 degenerated to war (Ayunts, Zolyan, & Zakaryan, 2016, 544). Pertinent to this term paper is what has since happened regarding the conflicted after the war ended in 1994 and the peace process began, more so from 1997 to this date. The second pertinent issue regards the relationship between Azerbaijan and its neighbor Iran. This is a complex issue as the name Azerbaijan traditionally belongs to a tribe or territory, a major segment of which is within Iran. Further, the two nations heavily rely on oil to fund their economies.
The relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia is wide, but the instant term paper mainly focuses on the relationship from the perspective of energy. It is the turning over of oil resources amounting to over one million barrels of oil per daily to Europe at the expense of Russia that has endeared Azerbaijan to the West (Radnitz, 2012, 70). Indeed, upon declaration of independence, Azerbaijan has tended more to the West in general and particularly to Russia’s bitter rivals the USA. This creates a background for the energy-based relations between the two nations. Finally, there is the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey from the perspective of joint projects and congruent challenges. It is worthy of notice that both Azerbaijan and Turkey have a majority Muslim population yet remain both secular and friendly to the Western World.
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Explain Azerbaijan’s position in the NK conflict since 1997
The Azerbaijan’s position regarding the NK conflict since 1997 spans 3 governments. The conflict between the two nations lie more within the people than within the governments and further that the governments themselves lack motivation to change it (Ayunts, Zolyan, & Zakaryan, 2016, 543). These particulars have been well reflected in the articles by Broers (2015) and Ayunts, Zolyan, and Zakaryan (2016), which both seek to understand the contemporary position of the conflict. However, in seeking to understand the contemporary position, these articles delve into the position taken by Azerbaijan in particular even as they give the said position a historical and contemporary justification. The historical elements, therefore, also bring to bear the contents of the book Bolukbasi (2014) in the very least for the purposes of factual comparison.
Both Broers (2015) and Ayunts, Zolyan, and Zakaryan (2016) have a consensus on the fact that Azerbaijan considers Armenia the castigator and main belligerent in the dispute as NK is Azerbaijan territory. Further, the contemporary issues influencing the opinion of the Azerbaijan government form part of the larger dispute between the traditionally communist world and the transatlantic nations which also factors Ukraine (Broers, 2015, 557; Ayunts, Zolyan, & Zakaryan, 2016, 549). Finally, there is an underling consensus that the conflict, which has mainly remained civil after the 1994 ceasefire, might resume soon at the instance of the Azerbaijan government. According to de Waal (2010) however, an intensive peace process has been ongoing, named the Minks Conference. The name stems from the original planned initial conference in Minsk, Belarus that however never took off. Subsequent meeting have been held in Rome under the auspices of Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and at West, Florida, in 2001 (de Waal, 2010, 161).
It is the contemporary Azerbaijan government position that winning in the NK region is a fundamental aspect of accomplishing the initial move for independence as commenced in 1991 (Broers, 2015, 558). Without NK, the independence mission is therefore considered incomplete. This exacerbated by the fact that according to Bolukbasi (2014) NK was attached to Azerbaijan to pile pressure on Turkey to join the Soviet Union, a fact that creates great reluctance on Armenia to acknowledge the touted entitlement of Azerbaijan to Armenia. Further, Azerbaijan has always aligned itself to NATO and the west and Armenia on the other hand has continually aligned with the Russians. Therefore, the opinion of Azerbaijan is by extension the opinion of America and NATO thus there might be no consensus soon unless a clear winner of the impending armed conflict can be discerned
Explain the major challenges in the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations
The Book Cornell (2011) records that the initial conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan began when the latter was still a member of the Soviet Union in 1989. This is because there is a section of the Azerbaijan tribe that is Iranian citizens and is desirous of reconnecting with their kinsmen inside Azerbaijan (Cornell, 2011, 322). According to Ipek (2009), Azerbaijan can neither afford to have Iran for an enemy nor have Iran for a friend. This creates a careful balancing act in the foreign relations between the two nations from which both try to capitalize as much as possible (Ipek, 2009, 227). The two nations declare rights over a huge section of the oil rich Caspian Sea, but have to contend over it over the exponentially more powerful Russia. Over and above this, the interests of the Azerbaijan economy rely heavily on Iranian goodwill. This is because the Strait of Hormuz is primary to the capacity of Azerbaijan to export its crude oil and a good section of that bay is Iranian territorial waters (Ipek, 2009, 227). It would, therefore, seem automatic that a good cordial relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran would ensue but it does not due to several major challenges.
The first major challenge is the Russian factor in the Caspian Sea. In attempting to keep the largest chunk of the sea and its resources, Russia has always attempted to put Iran against Azerbaijan by claiming ancient treaties between Iran and Russia that limit the control of the Caspian to only the two nations (Ipek, 2009, 233). The second major challenge regards the friendly nature of Azerbaijan with NATO in general and America in particular. Iran on the other hand is a renowned foe of both NATO and the USA stemming mainly from Iran’s nuclear proliferation (Ipek, 2009, 237). This places Azerbaijan in a complicated position as it is unable to support either side and has assumed neutrality. However, the fact that a majority of the oil interests in Azerbaijan are held by Western countries with the immediate neighbor Iran holding only 10% clearly shows who the main ally of Azerbaijan is.
Explain Azerbaijani-Russian relations through the energy perspective
Euphemistically, Russia has always been the elephant in the Azerbaijan’s energy resources room. Indeed, according to Ipek (2009), energy was the basis for the ending of the diplomatic relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. It is also the reason why Russia supported Armenia, leading to its initial victory in the NK War. Finally, energy based differences are the main reason why Azerbaijan tended towards America and the West as opposed to Russia and her former communist allies. This, as Ipek (2009) indicates is premised on the fact that Russia brought about the genesis of energy resource exploitation in Azerbaijan. The Russian’s therefore believe they have an entitlement to Azerbaijan’s energy reserves yet their current share is 10%, congruent to that of Iran.
Whereas the above reflects the general Azerbaijan perspective, the article by Radnitz (2012) looks at the issue from a more personalized level specifically regarding the Aliyev family. The Aliyevs have been in charge of the nation of Azerbaijan since 1998 when Heydar Aliyev won a disputed poll by a landslide vote of 76.1% (Radnitz, 2012, 64). This is pertinent to the relationship with Russia and energy as the family is deeply embedded in the oil business and also involved in the pilfering of oil money. The oil monies have enabled the family to have a firm grip on power through corruption, vote buying and even election malpractices as witnessed in the 2003 national elections when Ilham Aliyev won by 76.8% (Radnitz, 2012, 66).
The international community has however generally ignored the undoing of the Aliyevs in exchange for two considerations. First consideration is the continued favor towards the Western nations in oil energy resources exploitation in Azerbaijan. The second consideration is to side with the West against Russia in the continued conflict regarding the exploitation of energy reserves, and the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (Radnitz, 2012, 64). It is clear from the foregoing that despite having similar local interests, external factors have ensured an enmity between Azerbaijan and Russia, more so with regard to energy issues.
Explain Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey: Joint projects and challenges
According to Shiriyev and Davies (2013), Turkey and Azerbaijan are two majority secular states with a majority Islamic population who are also friendly to the USA and NATO. Turkey and Azerbaijan also share an 8 mile boundary. The relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan is extremely cordial as it lacks the external complications that affect the relationship with Russia and Iran. It also goes far back as Turkey was among the first nations to recognize the newly formed nation of Azerbaijan upon declaration of independence (Ibramovic, 2015, 84). Indeed, the Azerbaijan government has always termed Turkey as a special friend. This has enables several joint projects between the two nations albeit with several challenges.
Shiriyev and Davies (2013) is an article that inventories the joint projects that have been undertaken between Turkey and Azerbaijan as well as the underlying political and foreign policy implications underlying them. Turkey and Azerbaijan also share a common enemy in Armenia, whom they have however been unable to successfully confront due to Russian patronage (Shiriyev & Davies 2013, 202). Further, Turkish company Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) is a member of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and also major player in the Shah Deniz oil field project (Ibramovic, 2015, 84).
A bigger project is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that connects the energy resources in Azerbaijan to the international market through Turkey due to its border with the Mediterranean Sea (Ibramovic, 2015, 89). The constant challenge in this relationship has always been Russia, which considers itself as the dominant force in the areas surrounding the Caspian Sea. Russia, is the largest supplier of gas to Turkey, a fact that the Turkish government is uncomfortable with hence its enhanced focus on Azerbaijan (Ibramovic, 2015, 89). However, endemic corruption within Azerbaijan is a major challenge in the joint projects between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The similarities between the two countries are however greater than their differences, a fact that has enabled joint projects between them to flourish in spite of their differences.
Conclusion
Energy based resources are a powerful game-changer in the international political arena. After years of exploitation by the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan lost an important war immediately after declaration of independence. It was later taken over by a corrupt regime with one family, the Aliyevs running the country for over 20 decades now. Under normal circumstances, Azerbaijan would be a failed state, international pariah and at the mercy of Russia. Instead, it has a thriving economy, is an ally of the USA and NATO and is also having a fledging army. This is a great feat. It has enabled Azerbaijan have a reasonable relationship with Iran and maintain a respectable relationship with Russia that also involved sharing of energy resources and fruitful mutual projects with Turkey. Under the circumstances, Azerbaijan can be said to be doing very well from a political perspective.
References
Ayunts, A., Zolyan, M., & Zakaryan, T. (2016). Nagorny Karabakh conflict: Prospects for conflict transformation. Nationalities Papers , 44 (4), 543–559. doi:10.1080/00905992.2016.1157158
Bolukbasi, S. (2014). Azerbaijan: A political history . London: I. B. Tauris & Company.
Broers, L. (2015). From “frozen conflict” to enduring rivalry: Reassessing the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. Nationalities Papers , 43 (4), 556–576. doi:10.1080/00905992.2015.1042852
Cornell, S. (2011). Iran and the “Other” Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan since independence (pp. 318–358). United States: Sharpe, M. E.
de Waal, T. (2010). Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Survival, 52 (4), 159–176. doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.506830
Ibramovic, R. (2015). Turkish-Azerbaijani energy relations: Significant leverage in the implementation of the foreign policy interests of both countries - articles.
Ipek, P. (2009). Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and challenges for energy security. The Middle East Journal , 63 (2), 227–239. doi:10.3751/63.2.13
Radnitz, S. (2012). Oil in the family: Managing presidential succession in Azerbaijan. Democratization , 19 (1), 60–77. doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.641300
Shiriyev, Z., & Davies, C. (2013). The Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan Triangle: The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols. Perceptions , 18 (1), 185.
