Category five Hurricane Andrew that hit Florida and Louisiana in August 1992 is considered to be among the most expensive natural disasters in the history of the United States. However, it is important to point out that the aftermath effects of Andrew in Florida (specifically South Florida), were compounded by lack of a meaningful chain of command or management from the authorities mandated with mitigation of such disasters and their outcomes. There is a consensus that government resources were critical in addressing the problems created by Andrew, but significant failures punctuated implementation of response plans. The situation can be examined in the context of Schneider’s framework which posits that “the people make the place” in reference to organizations being functions of the people contained therein, and the people therein being the functions of an attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) cycle. The ASA cycle is critical in the understanding of factors driving organizational structures, processes, and technology (Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstiein, & Smith, 1995), hence their capacity to create, collaborate, compete, and control in response to such disasters.
Hurricane Andrew in Florida
The response of relevant authorities to Hurricane Andrew in Florida is regarded as a failure, which can be attributed to disconnect between responsible organizations in their ASA cycles. According to Schneider (2014), hurricane watches were issued in south Florida days before Andrew struck leading to the activation of the entire intergovernmental emergency response system. Warnings were issued and relevant personnel placed on standby. On confirmation that Hurricane Andrew would hit Florida, a state of emergency was declared prompting a chain of activity including evacuation of residents in the most at risk places. However, analysis of the response plan through the ASA cycle demonstrates that it fell short of accomplishing its main objective of preventing loss of life and extensive damage to property. This is evident in the declaration of the hurricane Andrew as a “major disaster” hours into its onslaught. The failure of the government response can be attributed to weak link in inter-organizational structures and processes that made it impossible to implement the new Federal response plan through mobilization of all governmental powers and resources in response to the catastrophe. It is clear that the government and other stakeholders demonstrated political and economic will in their response plans, but the broken link in inter-agency chain of communication points to assumption of a number of critical factors. One can argue that relevant authorities underestimated the effects of Hurricane Andrew, the first tripping step in countering the outcomes. Based on Schneider’s (2014) framework, it is evident that there was failure in demonstrating the values placed on human lives, security, safety, and physical property. Governmental institutions also failed in their role to timely channel their technical expertise towards the management of resulting problems, leading to a disjointed implementation plan. It further epitomizes the social distance between the citizens and government institutions. For instance, the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew was defined by lawlessness in the form of looting, robbery, destruction of property and other vices for survival, a situation that perilously impeded the recovery process. Failure of government institutions to foresee and plan for such developments by solely focusing on the hurricane itself contributed to the failed response. The govern response was defined by Schneider (2014) as slow and misguided and subsequently led to accusations of cover-ups by responsible government agencies and thousands of homeless remained without supplies or electricity.
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Hurricane Andrew in Louisiana
The general perception of the response to Hurricane Andrew in Louisiana was that it progressed quite well in contrast to the disjointed effort in south Florida. The success of thee implementation plan owes a lot to thorough adherence to the chain of command where reporting began at the local levels and worked itself up the intergovernmental organizations. Applying Schneider’s framework, one can argue that the response to Andrew in Louisiana was objectively determined through analysis of spillover of issues, symbolic dimensions, and legitimate involvement of government. Policies and agenda employed in Louisiana reflected the need for reduction of the gap between the public and response implementing agencies. However, it can be argued that the success of the response implementation plan in Louisiana is dependent on the fact that lessons were learnt from the Florida phase of the hurricane. According to Schneider (2014), Hurricane Andrew moved off into the Gulf of Mexico after the onslaught in south Florida. However, the few days’ difference cannot account for the contrasting manner in responses to the hurricane in the two locations. It is likely that Louisiana was more prepared in dealing with effects and aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, a situation the highlighted variability in government response to the same disaster in different locations. In Louisiana, the situation was helped by the existence of a working communication channel that facilitated mobilization of power and resources in response to the calamity. There is need to recognize the role of ASA cycle in the response to Hurricane Andrew in Louisiana in relation to equity demonstrated in the attraction-selection-attrition cycle in the response strategies. The need for government resources achieve positive response demonstrating the political and economic will and value placed on security, human lives, safety, and physical property. The success in implementation of the response plan was helped by the fact that the Louisiana storm peaked for a day and had reduced to severe weather by the next day. The success of the response plan played a significant role in eliminating any possible conflict between public expectations and pre-existing government strategies. And also aided positive behavior among those affected as they focused their efforts on rebuilding their lives rather than engaging in disruptive and defiant behavior for survival.
The Northridge Earthquake
The Northridge Earthquake in Los Angeles, California in January of 1994 epitomized the importance of prioritization of channeling technical expertise in addressing the problems caused by natural disasters. According to Schneider (2014), tremors from the Northridge Earthquake had severe psychological impacts on the local population, but the overall impacts have been rated a minimal considering the magnitude of the quake. Tens of thousands of people lost their homes, others hand no access to water or electricity supply, leading to initial reactions of confusion among the public. However, the manner in which the government expeditiously moved with speed and collaboration with other agencies ameliorated the building fears, quickly returning a sense of normalcy among the public. Overall the response of the government to the Northridge Earthquake is regarded as a success amidst the over 14,000 two-week aftershocks that followed the 6.7 magnitude quake that lasted between 10 and 20 seconds. The outcome was a major destruction of physical infrastructure impeding access to basic services and resources. The government response to the earthquake was fairly fast, with emergency rescue personnel conducting coordinated rescue and relocation of victims to safer locations. However, observers argue that relief worker fell short in their responsibilities and were unable to meet the high public expectations, thus resulting to a gap between the response agencies and the affected population. As noted in the previous cases of Hurricane Andrew, this is a common phenomenon where response efforts are not coordinated from the bottom upwards because it impairs communication of the most critical aspects of the plight of the victims. The government is lauded quick activation and implementation of the response plan as it had a crucial role in calming and restoring order to the affected communities. The effectiveness with which the emergent gap in the bureaucratic norms and respective behavior was addressed is evidence of the close link government institutions shared with the public, a critical factor in building trust and support towards response strategies for successful implementation.
References
Schneider, B. (1987). The people make the place. Personnel psychology , 40 (3), 437-453.
Schneider, B., Goldstiein, H. W., & Smith, D. B. (1995). The ASA framework: An update. Personnel psychology , 48 (4), 747-773.
Schneider, S. K. (2014). Dealing with disaster: Public management in crisis situations . Routledge.
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