Operation ANACONDA commenced on March 2,2002and was the most escalated war recorded by the United states after the war between the America and Vietnam in 1967 (Fleri et al, 2003). The preparations prior to the actualization of the operation resolved to gain control of the Afghanistan’s Shahi Kot valley by killing the key perpetrators of terrorism and the leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban groups. Although Operation ANACONDA was a success, they didn’t visualize of encountering a vast well equipped armed enemy. Richard B. andres and Jeffery B. Hukill implies that” the failure to integrate the air component into the planning process for Anaconda led to cascading errors.”. They realized that they had to train, organize themselves and be better equipped for future battles. This paper will feature an analysis of specific aspects of the war including command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver.
Command and Control
The overall commander for the joint mission was the Central Command (CENTCOM). The headquarters is located in MacDill Air Force Base. The Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) took the responsibility of securing most of the areas used by the enemies. At the end the approve command and control for Operation ANACONDA was led by Major General Hagen beck, Franklin L. He was to lead Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. The operation Anaconda used VTCs as a command and control tool. Unlike face to face communication which was neglected by the team, Operation Anaconda suffered problems of inconsistent and unreliable coordination. He had Tactical Control (TACON) of Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Dagger, Australian Special Operations Forces (TF 64), Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and elements of the 101st Airborne TF Rakkasan. TF Rakkason was mainly of the 7-101 AVN, 1-87 IN, 2-187 IN and 1-87 IN (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003) .
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
Intelligence
Task Force Mountain got Intelligence estimates from the air components and Special Operations Forces on the ground that they could be about 2,000 enemies Al Qaeda and Taliban. Task Force Mountain commander downgraded the intelligence he got. Major General Hagenbeck, plan was constructed based on several assumptions. It was believed that the enemies hiding in the valley were not that many. Furthermore, he had the chance to use space and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets, but the intelligence failed. This time of intelligence would have helped him make a better assessment of weapon caches, location of caves and al Qaeda and Taliban enemy strength. (Richard & Jeffrey, 2007) .
On the night of March first and the second they send out a Lockheed AC-130 gunship to conduct air surveillance. This was done to gather intelligence on the air assault landing zones (LZ). They reported no enemy activity in the LZ sites. However, another AC-130 reported that they had seen some people walking next to some of the blocking positions. The same AC-130 was tasked to recon the other assigned blocking positions. However, it had to turn around due to maintenance problems. Moreover, causing the hottest place of ANACONDA to be overlooked (Grant, 2005) . Both groups had overlooked or had narrow information concerning their opponents hence this resulted to an escalated war between them. Al Qaeda had the benefit of suitable rugged ground for defense from the military but were unable to put into effective use.
Fires
Task Force Mountain and Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) did not consider tactical air support. They believed to accomplish the mission, they will only need to send in mainly a ground assault. They trusted that they would only need a small roll of the U.S Air Force in the fight (Kugler, 2007) . In the struggle, the Taliban and Al Qaeda fired using heavy gun machines like mortars and rocket fires. The plan called for only 30 min of airstrikes by B-52s, F-15Es, and B-1s, before ground troops moved in. TF Mountain requested a limited number of AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters for the operation. They also did not have any M198 howitzers for Artillery support or a single armored vehicle (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003) .
The battle was hard and lasted more days than Task Force Mountain anticipated. As a result, they had to bring reinforcements. They got AH-64 attack helicopters from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. They got flown in by the Air Force using Boeing C-17 Globe master III. Additionally, they reposition the A-10 Thunderbolt II from Kuwait to Bagram Afghanistan. With all the additional reinforcements it helped turn the battle for Task Force Mountain (Grant, 2005) .
Movement and maneuver
The ANACONDA operation was set to begin 28 th of February. The operation was postponed to 2nd of March due to bad weather. The first ground troop from TF Rakkasan was air droop by CH-47 Chinook helicopters in to the LZ sites. They came under enemy fire right as soon as they got close. However, they did not sustain any casualties. Then they were followed by TF Hammer their main objective was to block enemy forces from escaping. Additionally, the Afghan commander, General Zia Lodin joined the team. He oversaw the main attack. The Afghan General had to fall back do to them having a lot of casualties (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003) .
After a few days of heavy fighting TF Mantuan got reinforcements by air and ground. Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) reinforced CJTF Mountain with the third Canadian Light Infantry Battalion. They help assault the last al Qaeda and Taliban enemy position win the Kot Valley (Richard, Andres B; Jeffrey, Hukill B, 2007) . The end of Operation ANACONDA was announced by CJTF Mountain Commander Major General Hagenbeck on 16 March 2002.
Conclusion
Given the circumstances , Operation ANACONDA claimed the lives of eight Americans and a total of 48 that were wounded (Richard, Andres B; Jeffrey, Hukill B, 2007) . It is believed that Al Qaeda and the Taliban had around 813 killed in action (Grant, 2005) . This indicated a successful war as the United States took over the place from the Al Qaeda. From the operation even the choice of the name Anaconda by the Task force group depicts the plan by the U.S army to set a strategic plan to triumph over the enemy. (Kugler, 2007) The Operation Anaconda being a combat incident resulted to learning of various lessons some negative others positive; For instance, matters to do with proper planning and intelligence also the general tactics involved when engaging in a war. The war was a success as implied by the ability of the United States to integrate joint operations and use of advanced technological systems in the war
References
Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). OPERATION ANACONDA CASE STUDY. Maxwell, Alabama: U.S Air Force.
Grant, R. (2005). Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective. WASHINGTON, DC: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE.
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Fort Belvoir, VA : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
Richard, Andres B; Jeffrey, Hukill B. (2007, January). Anaconda: A Flawed Joint Planning Process . Retrieved from NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a521067.pdf
