Abstract
Absolute success could be a term used to refer to Operation Anaconda. A mission of its kind in the history of the United States military operations since the onset of the 21st Century. It was a complex battle that took place in the year 2002 in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan. Shahikot was a highly revered place harboring enemy forces said to belong to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban terrorist groups. It was a mountainous region with difficult terrain and conditions only mastered by the enemy forces as their competitive advantage. However, despite the difficult terrain and many other operational challenges, Operation Anaconda ended as an American victory with an achieved goal.
However, the success of Operation Anaconda was almost hindered by various operational challenges in the mission command. According to Vego (2015), mission command refers to the power vested upon a military commander or a designated officer to exercise authority and provide direction through the use of mission orders. Most of the challenges occurred due to probable non-conformity to some of the six principles of command. The principles include the building of cohesive teams through mutual trust, the creation of a shared understanding, provision of a clear commander intent, the exercise of discipline initiatives, the use of mission orders, and accepting of prudent risks. The paper intends to provide an analytical review of the operation while considering the six principles of mission command. The significance of the analysis is to provide useful lessons and insights into conducting a successful mission operation.
Delegate your assignment to our experts and they will do the rest.
Operation Anaconda background analysis
Operation Anaconda was initiated in January and February of 2002 and the grand plan was to coerce the enemy forces to flee the Shahikot Valley. The plan incorporated the collective effort of the US Special Forces, Afghani forces, and other allied forces with the deployment of various equipment. The attack on Shahikot valley was planned to last three days with the use of light military equipment. The Afghani forces were tasked to lead the attack into the valley whose exits remained blocked by the US conventional forces to capture the enemy.
The plan was based on various assumptions that proved incorrect during the operation itself. One of the major assumptions was that the enemy forces would be coerced to fight from a rear-guard rationale and flee the valley but they instead chose to stay and fight back. It was also assumed that the enemy forces were estimated to be less in the hundreds and hence only light equipment would work. The plan further assumed that the enemy forces were interspersed with civilians on the lower grounds and that they would rely on small and light weaponry (Kugler, 2007). The assumptions proved to be quite wrong during the operation which posed significant challenges for the initial plan. The enemy forces were big in number, occupied strategic positions in the Shahikot Valley, and used heavy weaponry that significantly could not match that of the US Special Forces.
Challenges in the battlefield
The operation faced significant challenges due to the wrong assumptions made in the planning phase. From the onset, many of the operation’s challenges emanated from the Task Force MOUNTAIN’s plan and the level of unpreparedness. It almost appeared like they were trying to accomplish a lot using so little at their disposal despite the high level of US military capacity (Kugler, 2007). To begin with, the military forces encountered heavy action on the ground whereas they were using light military equipment. They were in various instances outnumbered by the enemy forces with superior weapons and had to rely on their precision and courage. They did not have all the equipment and assets required for the war at its onset and had to make urgent calls for reinforcement. There was also confusion in the operations due to the highly decentralized command limited by the communication protocols which affected information flow.
Victory strategies
Despite the challenges faced on the ground, the principle of building cohesive teams through mutual trust was observed highly for Operation Anaconda to emerge victoriously. Based on the decentralized command, the planning brought together all the concerned teams on board and trusted each other to win the war. As per the command principle of building team cohesion through mutual trust, the US military together with the allied forces was able to come together under one command and supported each other to complete the mission. The victory of the operation is highly attributable to the cohesion displayed by the military personnel under different military umbrellas with the US military as the command. The uniformity of operations by the teams on the ground clearly showed cohesion with instructions trickling down from one command.
For the team to win the war, the command was tasked with the role of disseminating information to all the stakeholders. That was in line with the principle of creating a shared understanding among the team members. Lack of a common understanding of the mission at the beginning caused a lot of chaos and confusion which led to the killing of a US soldier and the allied Afghan soldiers. The mission operation commander had to ensure a common understanding between the personnel on the ground and those at the command and Close Air Support bases. The prior planning of the mission equipped all the personnel with the full mission plans which enhanced the shared vision and goals of the war meant for the greater good.
The most evident principle in the operation was the principle of a clear intent from the command. The goal of the clear intent principle is not only to provide a well laid out mission structure but also to provide focus to the military personnel on the ground and all the supporting teams to accomplish the mission objectives(Aybar et al., 2015). The Operation Anaconda command perfectly modeled the principle of clear intent. Intending to win the war, the command listened to their team members on the ground and were able to adapt to the changing situations on the battlefield. Reinforcements were provided where necessary without delays, and decisions were made promptly. Furthermore, air support was well coordinated to support the teams on the ground through command instructions. All the coordination provided by the command team was a clear message that they were in the war to win and that there were no retreat chances.
Mission success is also highly dependent on the exercising of a disciplined initiative from the command. The principle of exercising disciplined initiative is a core leadership mandate in the military since that facilitates the timely coordination of activities (Lindner, 2013). Despite the challenges of communication breakdown, the command team of Operation Anaconda proved its prowess in making timely decisions in unison following the provided intelligence reports provided. The flexibility exercised was within the limit and that enabled the command to successfully steer the mission to victory.
Despite the challenges encountered in and outside the battlefield, all the personnel was able to stick to the mission orders and that was quite instrumental. That was also done as per the fifth principle of mission command of using mission orders. All the personnel on the ground listened to the military leadership from above without question. The command further relied on instructions from the Central Command where approvals on mission operations were conducted. Sticking to mission orders by all the personnel further provided unity of operations which was strategic in winning the mission. Therefore, the principle of using mission orders is quite tremendous in streamlining ground operations for the success of any operation.
The principle of prudent risk was applied under all the activities of Operation Anaconda from the planning to the end. The intelligence collection team had to weigh all the risks on the ground and in all support activities to ensure the accomplishment of the mission with minimal casualties. Despite the misguiding assumptions made at the onset of the mission, all the personnel was tasked with assessing the risks on the ground and relaying the information to the command for reinforcement whenever necessary.
Conclusion
Conclusively, Operation Anaconda was a huge success based on the minimal casualties reported with the mission having been accomplished. The operations conformed to the six principles of mission command. The principles comprised of goal-focused elements that promoted safety and minimized casualties while geared towards the achievement of victory. The principle of building cohesive teams through mission trust was essential in bringing all the Tactical Forces and allied military personnel for the success of Operation Anaconda. The operation was led under a unitary leadership structure that provided a clear command intent, and sufficient communication to all stakeholders. That fulfilled the principles of a clear commander intent and that of creating a shared understanding. The military personnel kept to mission orders fully after understanding the prudent risks of the operation. There was also exercise of the discipline initiative and that was key in the success of the operation.
There are a few lessons that can be derived from some of the mission operational challenges. That includes the need for meticulous intelligence to be drawn from the ground for sufficient planning purposes. The intelligence from the field at all times ought to be free of assumptions and instead rely on facts wand collected shreds of evidence from the battlefield. The military personnel also learned never to underestimate the opponents, and that it is better to over equip than under equip whenever necessary to avoid ambushing situations. The command must also trust the information from the ground personnel for better results.
References
Aybar, C., Baltacıoğlu, G., & Özkaynakçı, S. (2015). Leadership and Mission Command in Future Operational Environment. Journal of Military and Information Science, 3 (3), 88.
Lindner, W. C. (2013). Mission Command: Preparing the Fields for the Seed to Grow. International Security, 3 (2).
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan; a Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Case Studies in Defense Transformation, 5 (1), 3-28.
Vego, M. (2015). Operational Leadership. Joint Forces Quarterly , 77 (2).
