Security Management in a Private Security Company (PSC) in a War Zone

SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN A PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY (PSC) IN A WAR ZONE

Globally, Private Security Companies (PSC) have been at the center of the discourse on controversy and war. In the United States (U.S), private contractors have been used to in Afghanistan and Iraq to offer different kinds of services, key among them being armed security. The Department of Defense has also contracted PSCs to provide security in regions such as Bosnia. Schwartz (2011) argues that today, it seems that the department heavily relies on armed contractors to provide protection in times of either combat or stability operations. Questions have been raised by the Congress and media concerning the reliance on PSCs. These concerns arise from “numerous high-profile incidents in which security contractors have been accused of shooting civilians, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving inappropriately” (Schwartz, 2011). In U.S, there has been an observed increase in the number of PSCs. This increase is attributed to the reliance on these companies to provide security support in various countries where the U.S has operations (Shah, 2014). This essay will describe the state of security management in a private security company, especially in the context of war zones. Likewise, the paper will give an overview of the current state of private security contractors, and the issues that have been raised by those for and against PSCs. Lastly, the essay will give a summation of the problem.

The State of Private Security Contractors in the World

For over a decade, the U.S has observed a considerable increase in the number of PSCs. This increase has been catalyzed by the government’s over-reliance on these companies in many war regions, especially as observed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The growing reliance of private military personnel has been linked to “horrific human rights abuses.” These loopholes are usually attributed to “absence of a regulatory regime” that administrates the behavior of these private firms. The lack regulations prompted the instituting of a global movement aimed at establishing some form of legal framework so as to promote accountability amongst the PSCs (Shah, 2014). After several years of negotiations, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) was formed. This entity is charged with the responsibility of defining the mandate of private military companies (Shah, 2014).

The association mandated to ensure that PSCs are adhering to the ICoC was launched in September 2013 (Shah, 2014). Despite the efforts to establish an association to monitor the activities of the private military companies, various loopholes are still prevalent. For instance, the association lacks well-structured mechanisms of undertaking the mandate for which it was formed. Most focus has been aligned to the view that the regulation is another niche of international policies, forgetting the fact that the effectiveness of the association depends heavily on the willingness of nations to enact matching domestic legislations that can offer a system of enforcement (Shah, 2014). Likewise, discrete incentives which can galvanize the effectiveness of the ICoC are not yet in place. It is agreed that, despite the international recognition and acceptance to use PSCs, the regulations can only be effective through national or domestic policies. Hence, the current situation requires the establishment of a new international convention that focuses on private military and security assistance so as to truly address the problem of private military firms that is global (Scheimer, 2009).

Currently, the PSCs are not regulated and have thus posed a major challenge at the world stage. The PSCs are mandated to offer “actual armed combat support, advisory roles, security, and logistical support” (Scheimer, 2009). They are thus identified purely as commercial entities with a clearly defined business structure. Consequently, these companies compete openly in the global market to provide services to states, international institutions, other multinational corporations, as well as non-governmental organizations (Scheimer, 2009). Up until 2009, South Africa was the only nation that had formulated regulations to demarcate the operations of PSCs (Fulloon, 2015). The United States soon followed suit, establishing regulations to control the activities of its military dispatched to foreign countries. The regulations, which initially covered the work of the U.S military, were revised to include other civilians that joined the army in the operations. Before the revision of the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the activities of the PSCs were only liable to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). The regulations, however, still lack concrete inclusion of PSCs who offer their services to other entities apart from the military. Additionally, despite the fact that U.S citizens offering their services to the military can be prosecuted, those operating in foreign countries like Iraq escape the net. Moreover, the U.S cannot prosecute other international private security contractors (Scheimer, 2009).

The controversy over the use of PSCs has been fueled by politicians, practitioners, and legislators. Majorly the discussion has focused on four key issues. These include creation of a useful taxonomy of modern non-state forces; issues surrounding legality, legitimacy, accountability, transparency, state sovereignty and economic exploitation; the practical aspects, peacemaking and peacekeeping ‘efficiency’ of the companies; and lastly the need for adequate legislative regulation, supervision of industry participants by the executive branch and international law (Brauer, 2008). Some scholars have argued if they are well legalized and regulated, PSCs can become the biggest facilitators of development through the act of restoring peace in war-torn nations (Renou, 2005). However, there is still a big gap in understanding the essential traits of private security contractors entirely. Loopholes exist in matters of accountability as well as transparency which prevent the corporate mercenaries from being right actors for peace and development (Renou, 2005).

Following a review of the history of PSCs, key challenges have been noted in holding the companies accountable when problems occur. For instance, there have been gaps in the international policies and laws (Andrepoulos & Brandle, 2012). Despite the lack of concrete accountability terms, governments continue to hire the services of these private military and security firms to perform both military and police-related tasks” (Joachim & Schneiker, 2014). Consequently, the companies assume identities that are related to the military, business managers, and humanitarians. These are seen to be independent of the services they are mandated to offer, their market segment or their location in the battlefield (Joachim & Schneiker, 2014). Thus, the PSCs “are more corporatized, staffed by higher skilled retired military officers, ex-special forces units, technically specific skilled civil and military personnel, retired frontline combat personnel, intelligence personnel, and low-skilled Third World military personnel” (Fulloon, 2013). Militarized corporate firms have been on the increase, some aligning the increase to the cost-effectiveness of hiring the services of these companies (Blakely, 2006).

The Work of Private Security Companies

Sierra Leone and U.S are some of the known states that have hired the services of private military contractors. Also, private security firms have been contracted by multinational organizations such as the United Nations (U.N), among other humanitarian and development agencies. Further, reports are purporting that private security groups have been hired by “rebel groups and drug cartels.” In spite of the notions, there are two broad categories of outsourced security services that are prevalent in many regions. First, there are those that are hired by humanitarian organizations operating in the global south including sub-Saharan Africa. Other companies are engaged by developed states to carry out combat services in war zones. The happenings in Iraq adequately exemplify this. The use of PSCs in war zones arises from the quest to benefit from the services of “a smaller, more efficient military” (Blakely, 2006).

The increase of PSCs resulted from “disorganized military forces such as Sierra Leone that needed help to curtail rebel insurgencies, dictators trying to protect their political power and hard-line rule, as well as mining and oil companies operating in Third World countries seeking to protect their valuable natural resources from the insurgencies” (Fulloon, 2013). These scenarios have increased over the years, giving rise to the use of companies in direct military combats hence directly influencing the successes of military engagements. In the U.S, incentives seem to be in favor of the PSCs in carrying out particular military functions and services as opposed to relying entirely on their armed forces (Fulloon, 2013). Subsequently, Fullon (2013) cites that private security contractors are “the newest addition in the modern battlefield and their role is increasingly becoming significant and influential as the Private Military Company (PMC) industry grows.

Critics against the industry view PSCs as nothing more than corporate mercenaries. This is because the firms represent a new form of military service provider on both the domestic and international stage (Fulloon, 2013). Likewise, these companies operate under conventional corporate structures and are classified as legal commercial businesses. They even formally listed on the stock exchanges. Private security contractors also produce corporate readings, attend international conferences, maintain websites, and most often tend to be allied to defense and security professional associations (Fulloon, 2013). The operations of the security contractors in war zones thus need regulations so as to understand, prosecute, and administer justice to victims of crimes arising from them. This calls for the management of outsourced military services in line with national regulation and other regional policies (Shah, 2014).

The International Law and Private Military Operations

The operations of PSCs in many war zones have sparked controversy from many circles. It has been claimed that the most horrendous human rights abuses of the wars have been perpetrated by these outsourced operations. This is majorly attributed to the lack of policies that regulate the activities of these private security firms. Subsequently, extended periods of negotiations led to the formulation of the ICoC in 2010, which was mandated to monitor the activities of private security companies in foreign fields. Additionally, a body was formed in 2013 to oversee the compliance of private enterprises to the regulations stipulated in the Code. The body, however, had no concrete structures in place to allow it to enforce the rules. Moreover, individual states lacked the regulations that would ensure that the Codes’ are performed and exercised as outlined (Shah, 2014).

The 2001 U.S invasion of Afghanistan caused the ballooning use of private security military. This extensive use led to an increase in heinous acts accruing from the wars. When the inhumane acts came to light, it sparked outrage from both the domestic and international community. This led to what Shah (2014) claimed: “highlighted the legally ambiguous space in which contractors operated.” Informed by this, policy reforms began in the U.S that were aimed at holding private firms and individuals accountable for their actions. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) which was formed in 2000 was revised in 2004 to allow private military companies taking part in military functions outside to the U.S to be prosecuted. The charges would include more than one year in prison if the acts were committed within the U.S (Shah, 2014). The Uniform Code of Military Justice was also amended in 2007 to subject “contractors to the system of courts-martial should they engage in misconduct” (Shah, 2014).

The scope of PSCs is ever increasing, giving rise to more and more multinational companies. This has posed a problem because most of the regulations established in the U.S are only applicable to U.S citizens. The business is reaping revenues totaling to billions of dollars per year. Interestingly, there are “no clear statutory basis to hold the whole company liable” (Shah, 2014). Initially, the U.S was the only major consumer of this lucrative business but currently more consumers are arising in support of the industry. Another gap is the fact that most regulations do not impose penalties on activities that are non-military. The formation of the ICoC began in the middle of the 2000s as a move to fill the void and construct “a global regime that can better monitor these companies, ensure compliance with human rights norms and international humanitarian law, and hold violators accountable” (Shah, 2014). The Swiss government working together with the International Committee of the Red Cross pioneered the efforts towards this goal, and the document was completed in 2008 (Shah, 2014). The efforts were later complemented by a diversified group of stakeholders, eventually leading to the creation of the ICoC. The ICoC gives an outline of the “obligations of private security companies under the international law and specifies rules that ought to govern the use of force and vetting procedures for subcontractors” (Shah, 2014). The Code has received support from various states and non-governmental organizations and has also been accepted by more than seven hundred multinational firms. This has been a major step in the path towards ensuring integrity and compliance of the companies with international human rights standards. However, the law has been noted to have significant loopholes that arise from lack of precise structures to be assimilated in domestic policies (Shah, 2014).

The lack of well-structured mechanisms to address the current challenges calls for the ICoC to establish a worldwide governance system that will comprehensively bring together all stakeholders. The legal status that defines the operations of private security contractors is currently ambiguous. In most operations that have eventually escalated to international crimes, there has been a “complete absence of legal prosecution” (Kalidhass, 2014). Thus, the concerns of the international community and other human rights advocates are on the accountability gap arising from the use of military when related to the context of the international law. The role of private security contractors on abusing human rights in combat is currently a fact in the global scenario (Kalidhass, 2014).

Many queries have been asked in the debate on the issue of private security contractors. However, the discussion has been focused on issues such as whether the contractors “are subjects of international law to sue or be sued directly before domestic or international courts or tribunals” (Kalidhass, 2014). The ICoC board of directors is mandated to “monitor and certify the compliance of signatory companies” (Shah, 2014). Most of the membership of the ICoC is drawn from multiple stakeholders that include civil society, contractors, countries, and other interested organizations that agree to follow, advocate and support international human rights in wars. The code also provides a procedure to follow up and report crimes that are observed in the battlefields (Shah, 2014).

These incentives, though positive, still lack structures that can “engender compliance” in line with the outlined regulations. For instance, there is an absence of a jury that can adequately hold and incriminate the contractors when their activities are proved to be against human rights. As a result, the contractors choose to adhere to the regulations that are outlined in the ICoC document voluntarily. Several proposals have been floated to manage and control the activities of private security contractors. First, a multilateral treaty has been adopted that mandates members of the association to establish local regulations and policies in line with the ICoC guidelines. These plans will allow for prosecution of contractors when they violate international human rights laws in their conduct. However, in reality, due to the politics that exist around the issue, such an incentive is not viable in the near future. Shah (2014) asserts that “the international consensus” needed to ensure such measures are put in place does not exist in the current world (Shah, 2014).

Another proposal put forward is “to leverage profits from government contracting to induce compliance” (Shah, 2014). Since many governments and organizations, including the United Kingdom (U.K) and U.N have hired companies based on membership in the ICoC Association, the basis of this option holds. This is because “the potential loss of business opportunities will deter companies from disregarding the Code’s obligations” (Shah, 2014). The option, however, has two significant weaknesses. In the U.S and amongst its allies, the military budget has been reduced over the years. Due to this, it may be concluded that the U.S and its associates will have limited power to exert influence on the operations of PSCs. The contractors will get better deals from probable non-members of the ICoC Association. The incentive to use America and its western allies to leverage the adoption of the ICoC by contractors is a limited option because many countries that need the services of the contractors are still non-members. Another gap is the fact that the companies may end up regulating themselves hence will “legitimize their activities, akin to what has previously occurred” (Shah, 2014). For over a decade, private security companies have established associations that deflect the views of critics and enhance their standards. However, these self-managed efforts have extremely fallen short of the mark of integrity.

Most of the members of the ICoC Association are companies. This can cause a deflated influence on the board composition and hence the implementation of the code. The prospects to fully see a liable contract security industry cannot be left to the market. To fully enforce the code and ensure that there is proper management and justice administration, governments must be engaged. This way, inconsistency on the management would be addressed, putting forward the debates that have risen against private security contractor over the years. Moreover, incentives must ensure there is a universal, comprehensive policy framework that will enhance domestic legislative actions in regulating the operations of the private military (Shah, 2014).

In conclusion, the formation of the ICoC brings forward a comprehensive approach towards addressing the challenges that arise in managing the activities of private security contractors in war zones. However, as outlined above, there are still many existing loopholes that need to be sealed. For instance, the international policies, the outlined guidelines in the Code and domestic policies need to be harmonized. The association is an important and probably viable step in establishing an international regulation. Despite the positivity that comes with the association, several hurdles arise, as has been observed in previously efforts to manage the private security companies, especially in war zones. There are disparities in both local and foreign policies which do not give clear guidance on the operations of contractors, especially in foreign countries. With the booming of the PSCs market, stakeholders must take up the challenge so as to seal the existing loopholes and avoid future dangers. Governments, companies, civil society, and non-governmental organizations must also work together to address this issue. Building on the already established foundation and the lessons learned all stakeholders must work together to form a comprehensive policy framework. This will be vital in ensuring that the PSCs function with the law, and it is only by doing this that the controversy surrounding the use of PSCs will be adequately addressed.

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