It is agreed that state-sponsored terrorism is not the cause of terror. However, it has been increasingly appreciated that it plays a significant role in facilitating terror within the international system especially over the past five decades. States that sponsor terrorist organizations will do so in a variety of ways that include, inter alia , financing, diplomatic cover, weapons, intelligence and training. The net effect of such succor is the significant increase in the capabilities of terrorists, consequently amplifying the lethality and frequency of attacks. The relations that exist between states and terrorist groups will vary dramatically across a broad continuum depending on amongst other factors the interests of the state. Thus, while some states will merely countenance terrorism or offer modest to intermittent support, others will strongly invest in a terrorist group to achieve certain outcomes.
State sponsorship of terrorism, though traceable to various historical moments, did not become a major feature of the international system until the post-World War II era when the world witnessed the emergence of middle-eastern terrorism that was propelled by the Lebanese civil war and the Israel-Arab conflict (Collins, 2014) . The Soviet Union had however been accused much earlier of having covert support for various Marxist and communist terror groups across the world. There is wide consensus that it was indeed in the late 20 th century that proliferation of state-sponsored terrorism was witnessed (Cohan, 2002) . This has triggered tremendous research into why an assortment of states has opted for state-sponsored terrorism as a means of attaining their ends. The connecting causal thread would appeasadar to be that sponsored terrorism is effective, cost friendly and is covert thus offering room for plausible deniability (Ganor, 2007) . Almost undeniably, a country that has been accused of being the chief sponsor of terror in recent years has been Iran.
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Iran’s leadership has been accused of using terrorist groups to advances her interests since the current regime came to power in 1979 (Byman, 2008) . In the last three decades, Iran has continued to support terrorism through organizations like Hama in Gaza , Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The principal mode through which Iran has supported these terrorist groups has been through the provision of weapons (Collins, 2014) . For instance, Iran is accused of supplying Hezbollah with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms as well as grounds training for thousands of the movement’s fighters. Similar support that includes funding has also been allegedly offered by Iran to Hamas amongst other Palestinian terrorist groups. The country is also said to support these groups by providing a safe haven in Iran to some of these organizations’ leaders who are amongst the most wanted in the world. Other claims are that Iran has facilitated the acquisition of diplomatic cover to some members of terrorist groups who use them to gain illegal entry into other jurisdictions. To others, Iran is the moral leader of many of these organizations thanks to its brand of Shia Islam that offer ideological support to these terrorist groups (Daniel, 2015) .
The strategic interests that drive Iran to support terrorist organizations are relatively well known. First, this has been Iran’s strategy of bleeding and undermining rivals. Through terrorist and insurgent groups, Iran seeks to weaken rival governments like Israel and Saudi Arabia. This technique was perhaps first applied against the regime of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and Iran has perfected it to date. Thus, Iran today engages in a proxy war against Israel through terrorist groups like Hezbollah (Daniel, 2015) .
For Iran, it is also a way of projecting her power. Tehran faces an increasingly weak economy and military largely thanks to western sanctions. With the frequent plunges in global oil prices, the mainstay of Iran’s economy, this weakness has become even more pronounced. Its ideological appeal also seems to have faded over the years with Saudi Arabia emerging as the Islamic capital of the Middle East (Collins, 2014) . Within such circumstances, it has become increasingly difficult for Iran to play a major role in regional affairs. This is despite the fact that Iran sees herself as a regional leader thanks to her historical dominance in the region. Supporting terrorist groups like the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the ways for Iran to maintain itself as a powerful player in the region (Daniel, 2015) .
In Iran’s view, an alliance with terrorist groups is a means of pressuring neighbors who cozy up to the United States. Iran and the United States have remained arch rivalries since the Iranian revolution as Iran has embraced more Islamic fundamentalism under essentially a theocratic system. Friendly relations between the United States and Iran’s neighbors are viewed by Tehran as encirclement and therefore a security risk (Ganor, 2007) . Terrorist groups , therefore, are a means for Iran to keep American interests in the region at bay. In addition, terrorism is a retaliatory tool for Tehran. Terror attacks in France in the 1980s were retaliation by Iran for French support of the belligerent Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq which was by and large a western proxy. Terror attacks on Israel by Hezbollah have been retaliation by Tehran for the deaths of Iranian nuclear scientists amongst other covert acts by Israel (Daniel, 2015) .
Iran has also used terrorist groups as spoilers of what would otherwise be against Iranian interests. It has therefore offered succor to groups that attack Israeli-Syrian and Palestinian-Israeli peace talks which Iran has been strongly opposed to since it views them as a betrayal of the Muslim cause and a violation of her regional interests (Cohan, 2002) . More crucially, the alliance with terrorist groups is meant to ensure that Iran has open options in case of conflict. In a highly volatile region, Tehran uses these groups as contingencies to compensate for relative weakness (Daniel, 2015) . In other words, these violent groups are leverage to be employed in case the current hostility morph into open hostility.
Iran’s state-sponsored terrorism can be seen as a success if compared to its aforementioned goals. Today, Iran is a country able to punch beyond her weight. Despite having a relatively small economy by regional standards, Iran is able to influence affairs in the region more in the same league as Saudi Arabia. Iran has been a decisive player in the Yemeni conflict where Houthi Rebels, which it has backed, have been able to topple the government, take Sanaa and retain control in much of the country’s territory that it has occupied. This is despite the intensification of support for pro-government faction and air bombardment by Saudi Arabia, a country that is not currently comparable to Iran in military and economic muscle. There is increased recognition by the international community that the resolution of the Yemeni conflict will require the involvement of Iran.
A near similar scenario unfolds in Syria whether Iran and Russia have been decisive backers of the western embattled Syrian President Assad. In Iraq, Iran has been an important player in that country’s conflict more so after the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Internationally, Iran has been able to garner international attention more so through the nuclear deal negotiations, and in fact, it was a major foreign policy issue in the United States during the 2016 election. The attainments for Iran are undoubtedly partly linked to the country’s maintenance of an elaborate state-sponsored terrorism program.
References
Byman, D. (2008). The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism. The Brookings Institution .
Byman, D. L. (2015). State sponsor of terror: The global threat of Iran. The Brooking Institution .
Cohan, J. A. (2002). Formulation of a State Response to Terrorism and State Sponsored Terrorism. Pace International Law Review , 78-110.
Collins, S. (2014). State-Sponsored Terrorism: In Decline,Yet Still a Potent Threat. Politics and Policy, 42 (1), 131-159.
Ganor, B. (2007). Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, The Middle East Quarterly , 87-89.
